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INTRODUCTION
In January 2007, CBS News chief foreign correspondent Lara
Logan sent out an e-mail asking for help. She objected to the fact that
a story developing two blocks from her office in Baghdad was being
"ignored" by the CBS Evening News, which normally aired her
reports.' Less than two miles away from the seat of Iraq's government,
in Baghdad's "Green Zone," footage showed what appeared to be sev-
eral Iraqi army soldiers fallen in combat, and the bodies of several
Iraqi civilians showing clear signs of torture. Buildings smoldered and
crumbled nearby.2 The CBS Evening News didn't run the story, even
though it found time in January for stories on the Super Bowl, soccer,
I See Rory O'Connor & Daid Olson, Helping Lara Logan Uan. 25, 2007), http:/
/www.mediachannel.org/wordpress/2007/0 1/24/helping-lara-logan.
2 See Battlefor Haifa Street (CBS online videoJan. 18, 2007), http://ivww.cbsnews.
com/video/watch/?id=2371456.
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lottery winners, horse racing, and reality television shows.3 The foot-
age appeared on YouTube, a subsidiary of Google, however, and has
been viewed more than 25,000 times.4
Many Internet users sought out another Logan scoop on You-
Tube, where Logan's report about children starving nearly to death in
an Iraqi orphanage, and her interview with CNN about attempts by
the U.S. government to suppress the story, were viewed more than
10,000 times.5 About a year after that story aired, Logan told The
Daily Show that the American public was grossly uninformed on the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that the soldiers fighting them felt
forgotten. She noted that the media never shows footage of dead
3 See, e.g., CBS Evening News: Two African-American Coaches Face Off in Super Bowl
(CBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2007) (transcript), available at htip://lexisnexis.
com; CBS Evening News: Missouri Couple Wins Powerball Jackpot (CBS television broad-
cast Jan. 29, 2007) (transcript), available at http://Iexisnexis.com; (search of Lexis
"ALLNWS" database for "'CBS Evening News' & 'CBS News Transcripts"' for dates
Jan. 1, 2007 to Jan. 31, 2007). CBS did run other stories on Haifa Street, none of
them as graphic or as troubling as the Logan piece.
4 Battle for Haifa Street (YouTube online video Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=VJeNkQefPok.
5 On or about June 10, 2007, U.S. Army soldiers on patrol in Baghdad, along
with Iraqi units they were advising, chanced upon a government-run orphanage hous-
ing twenty-four disabled Iraqi boys chained to their cribs in 100-degree heat, covered
in flies and obviously starving. CBS Morning News: U.S. Soldiers Find Starving Special
Needs Orphans in Iraq Tied to Their Cribs (CBS television broadcastJune 19, 2007) (tran-
script available on Lexis Nexis; search "Transcripts" database for exact phrase "starv-
ing special needs orphans" using terms and connectors search). Even though the
Iraqi Prime Minister ordered the officials in charge of the orphanage arrested, its
manager appeared in a press conference with the Iraqi Labor and Social Affairs Minis-
ter to defend the orphanage and its leadership. Id. Ms. Logan found out about the
story and saw photographs of the facility, but was initially told by a U.S. official that
she needed Iraqi government permission to air the story in the United States. Id.
The official relented when she reminded him or her that she had photographs of
American, not Iraqi, soldiers carrying the boys out of the orphanage. Id. The Iraqi
Labor and Social Affairs Minister called the story a manipulation and distortion of the
facts in order to celebrate the Americans' "alleged kindness." Id. The Minister
obtained his post by being affiliated with the political party of Muqtada al-Sadr, whose
followers took over Iraq's Health Ministry and reportedly used it to torture and mur-
der dozens of hospital patients, disposing of their bodies in mass graves. See Fareed
Zakaria, Iraq's Dark Day of Reckoning, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 2006, at 43; CNN Reliable
Sources: Bloomberg Leaves GOP (CNN television broadcast June 24, 2007) (transcript
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0706/24/rs.01.html). For
the videos and viewer counts, see First Look: Iraqi Orphanage (CBS News) (CBS television
broadcast June 19, 2007), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cwVGwb-
PUU8; First Look: Piloting Success (CBS News) (CBS television broadcastJune 19, 2007),
available at http://wvv.youtube.com/watchv=O2tskEynogl (viewed 335,391 times,
posted by CBS itself).
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soldiers to the American public, so that "nobody really understands"
the wars except those living them. 6 "If I were to watch the news that
you're hearing in the United States . . . it would drive me nuts," she
added. 7
Several lawsuits are pending that could remove all such underre-
ported and otherwise suppressed stories from YouTube and other
Internet services. Viacom, which owned CBS until they split in 2005,
is suing YouTube for $1 billion over copyrighted video. 8 Other plain-
tiffs have filed a putative class action against YouTube on behalf of
thousands of copyright owners. 9 Both suits seek injunctions of the
type that shut down Napster in 2001.10
These suits raise several important questions about the future of
media policy and freedom of expression in both the United States and
around the world, as YouTube is available in many other countries
(unless they happen to be blocking it that day).11 These questions
include: What responsibility does an Internet corporation like You-
Tube have for the unauthorized posting of CBS or CNN footage onto
its site? What procedures must a copyright holder like CBS or CNN
follow to inform YouTube of its rights, or to institute a claim for
infringement in the event that an amicable resolution cannot be
reached? What will the effects be on access to information and free-
dom of expression in the United States and around the world if such
lawsuits, or the threats that they will be filed, become widespread?
This Article will analyze the legal and human rights implications
of efforts by copyright owners such as Viacom to "opt out" of sites such
as YouTube. The thesis is that courts and legislatures should reject
the argument by copyright owners that absent a license agreement
6 The Daily Show with John Stewart: Lara Logan (Comedy Central television broad-
cast June 18, 2007), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?
videold=1 73871&title=Lara-Logan.
7 Id.
8 See Frank Ahrens, Viacom Sues YouTube over Copyright, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2007, at D2.
9 See Amended Class Action Complaint at 2-6, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc.,
2008 WL 2627388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 3582) (the class action between The
Football Premier League Limited and Youtube was joined with the Viacom action).
10 See id. at 54; Ahrens, supra note 8 (noting that Viacom is seeking an injunction
to prevent YouTube from posting additional copyrighted material); Napster Forced to
Shut Down, BBC NEws, July 3, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/
1420204.stm ("Song-swapping service Napster was forced to shut down its website
temporarily ....").
11 See, e.g., Thomas Fuller, Thailand Blocks Users'Access to YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2007, at C12; Posting of Stan Schroeder to Mashable: All That's New on the Web,
http://mashable.com/2007/05/30/youtube-bans/ (Mar. 30, 2007, 12:49 PM PDT).
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respecting a copyrighted work, technology and Internet companies
should be forced to monitor for and technologically filter out any
quotations or clips on their sites unless a copyright owner "opts in" to
being included on the site. Instead of this type of an "opt-in" frame-
work, judges and policymakers should require the copyright owner to
identify the location of a specific infringing copy on the Internet with
adequate detail to permit an Internet service provider to respond by
removing the copy from its site once it has confirmed that the copy is
infringing. This "opt-out" framework will better preserve innovative
technologies for guaranteeing the human rights to adequate informa-
tion and freedom of expression than would a different, opt-in system,
which would establish copyright holders and online intermediaries as
more intrusive censors of Internet users' speech and available
information.
Part I will briefly describe the development of Web 2.0 services
such as YouTube, and the complex intellectual property issues they
create. Part II presents a thumbnail sketch of copyright law and limi-
tations on copyright in the United States and Europe. Part III traces
the case law in the United States on opting out of the Internet, from
the early cases in which courts struggled with the possibility that copy-
right law would chill the development of online services, to the more
recent judicial consensus shielding online intermediaries from liabil-
ity as long as they do not purposefully disregard opt-outs identifying
specific infringing content. Part IV advances the scholarship in this
field by showing that European courts have erected a similar knowl-
edge-based opt-out framework for online intermediaries, although
some cases have bucked this trend. Part V addresses, and rebuts, the
common objection that international copyright treaties preclude the
establishment of an opt-out regime in Internet copyright cases.
Finally, Part VI provides an overview of currently pending cases that
will define the future of Web 2.0 and other online services such as
digital libraries and news aggregators. In conclusion, the benefits of
adopting an opt-out rather than an opt-in framework for copyright
disputes on Google, YouTube, eBay, Wikipedia, and other online ser-
vices are surveyed and assessed against some potential costs. Weigh-
ing the harms to communication and access to knowledge posed by a
general obligation of Internet service providers to monitor and censor
their networks against the benefits, this Article comes down against
such an obligation, and in favor of an opt-out system. 12
12 For a previous publication addressing similar questions, see Oren Bracha,
Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of
Property, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1799, 1804-05 (2007) (arguing that an opt-out rule regulat-
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEB 2.0
Although the U.S. government pioneered computers as early as
the 1940s and the precursor to the Internet starting in the late 1960s,
members of the public only began to adopt these technologies in
large numbers in the 1980s. 13 Starting in about 1991, the World Wide
Web opened up the Internet to a wider universe of readers, 14 and
politicians became more active in underwriting popular access to an
"information superhighway" of electronic resources and federally col-
lected information.1 5 The Web doubled in size every year in the
1990s,16 as tens of millions of Americans subscribed to the providers
of Internet connectivity like America Online1 7 and began to utilize
Web hosting services like GeoCities, portals like Yahoo!, search
engines like AltaVista, social networking sites like Classmates.com, and
other Internet service providers (collectively, ISPs).18 By 2007, most
subscribers to providers of dial-up Internet service had migrated to
high-speed broadband service.' 9 The increased bandwidth of broad-
band Internet access facilitated the streaming and transfer of audio,
video, and game content in Web 2.0.20
Web 2.0 is growing more popular as an umbrella term for diverse
Internet-based services. They are distinguished by their somewhat
ing online intermediaries' liability for copyright infringement by their users will bet-
ter promote "socially beneficial initiatives," "a variety of online digital libraries," and
therefore "cultural democracy").
13 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997); KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE 43-81 (1996).
14 See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB 49-60 (1999); Mike Mills, Scientist's
Brainchild Grows into a Global Phenomenon, WASH. POST, June 30, 1996, at A15.
15 See Evelyn Richards, Bush to Propose $2 Billion, High-Tech Initiative, WAiH. POST,
Sept. 7, 1989, at Fl.
16 See MTV Networks, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
17 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, AOL 5.0 Unplugs Other Internet Providers, WASH. POST,
Dec. 24, 1999, at El; Press Release, Number of Online Users in U.S. Reaches 70.7
Million, but Changes Loom (Aug. 8, 2001), http://www.tr.com/newsletters/rec/
troc2qpr.htm.
18 Federal law defines an Internet service provider as a provider of online services
or network access, or the operator of facilities used for such services or access. See 17
U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) (2006).
19 See Posting of Aditya Kishore to Internet Evolution, http://www.internetevolu-
tion.com (Oct. 1, 2007); see also David Vise, AOL and Cable Sibling Form Partnership,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at E5 (describing AOL & Time Warner's partnership as
"aimed ... at helping AOL stem the continuing loss of dial-up subscribers to faster or
cheaper internet services").
20 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (WIPO), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE
INTERNET 46-47 (2002), http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/2002_WIPO-elssues-
report.pdf.
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richer multimedia content and higher degree of interactivity and user
control from older, "Web 1.0" sites like online newspapers or portals.
Web 2.0 sites range from social networking sites to virtual worlds, user-
generated content platforms, peer produced-public domain encyclo-
pedias, next-generation peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies,
enhanced weblogs (also known as blogs), and audio and video blogs
(also known as podcasts and vlogs, respectively). 21 Among social
networking sites, MySpace, Facebook, and Linkedln are leaders as
measured by numbers of users and market value. Virtual worlds and
online games like World of Warcraft, Guild Wars, City of Heroes, and Sec-
ond Life claim tens of millions of virtual residents and participants. 22
Among user-generated content sites, YouTube, MySpace, Facebook,
Google Video, MSN Video, DailyMotion, and Flickr are prominent in
terms of their legions of viewers and contributors. 23 Wikipedia is the
clear leader in the area of user-generated content based in large part
on public domain material, although its imitators are also expanding
rapidly.24 BitTorrent is probably the most popular of the more
advanced peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.25 Podcasts seem to be
everywhere, with more than 18.5 million listeners by the end of
21 See Eric Barbry, Web 2.0: Nothing Changes . . . but Everything Is Different,
COMMC'NS & STRATEGIES, 1st Quarter 2007, at 91-92 (explaining that the Web 2.0
design, which favors "collaborative and social exchanges" is a "return to the basics of
the original internet"); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119 (2007); Sheila Dabu, Reaching for Higher Learning on You-
Tube, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 13, 2007, at L3, available at http://www.thestar.com/arti-
cle/245619. Peer-to-peer file-sharing software accesses directories of users and files
maintained by the software's provider or other users, which directories then commu-
nicate the Internet addresses of users with specific files to other users seeking those
files, whose computers then establish connections with the providing users and
download copies of MP3 or other files directly. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2001).
22 For a brief description of one of these virtual worlds, Second Life, see Bragg v.
Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595-96 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
23 Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, User-Generated Content Drives Half of
U.S. Top 10 Fastest Growing Web Brands (Aug. 10, 2006) (on file with author), avail-
able at http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/PR_- 060810.pdf; Interactive Advertising
Bureau Europe, MySpace Becomes Most Visited U.S. Site, THE INFORMER (London), July
2006, http://cecollect.com/ve/ZZns9667uqjx6562g3.
24 See Miguel Helft, Wikipedia Competitor Being Tested by Google, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2007, at C3.
25 See Lee Gomes, The Year in Technology: Pirates, Flash Memory and Hobbies-Oh,
My!, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2008, at BI.
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2007,26 but among the most popular are those available on Apple's
iTunes service. 27
Web 2.0 raises intellectual property (IP) issues that are similar in
kind to, but somewhat more complex than, those raised by more tradi-
tional Web and file-sharing technologies. Like the Web 1.0 sites of
Free Republic, MP3.com, or Napster that preceded them, sites like
MySpace and YouTube stand accused of facilitating the infringement
of copyrights in thousands or even millions of songs, television shows,
and motion pictures. As a result, the figure of the Internet user fight-
ing a big corporation to access information, or to preserve the right of
free expression in Web or video form, is becoming an iconic one in
American culture. The World Wide Web and user-generated content
sites such as YouTube frequently trigger threats from copyright hold-
ers when their users submit content referencing, parodying, or sam-
pling copyrighted work.28 Unlike Napster, however, these companies
were not founded with the intent to distribute copyrighted music to
26 See Stephen Baker & Heather Green, Social Media Will Change Your Business,
Bus. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
content/feb2008/db20080219-908252.htm.
27 See Rob Pegoraro, Zippity Zune? Nah., WASH. PosT, Nov. 15, 2007, at DI; see also
Posting of Rick to Burning Questions, http://blogs.feedburner.com/feedburner
(Apr. 18, 2006) (noting that in 2006, all subscription services other than iTunes made
up only 43% of subscription market share, according to one of Apple's competitors).
28 One recent scandal involved Volkswagen attempting to suppress a parody of
one of its recent advertisements, which made a biting commentary on the company's
Nazi past. See David Kravets, VW 'Nazi' Subpoena Points Up YouTube Privacy Risks, WIRED
NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/hollywood/news/2007/
09/vwparody-ad (reporting that after Volkswagen filed a subpoena seeking the iden-
tity of a user for allegedly violating copyrights, the doctored video was removed from
YouTube). Another famous story involved the mother of a young baby who posted to
YouTube a 29-second video of her child dancing to the tune of Prince's "Let's Go
Crazy." SeeJim Avila et al., The Video Prince Doesn't Want You to See, ABC NEWS, Oct. 27,
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/thelaw/story?id=3777651 &page=l. YouTube informed
her that her video had been removed from the site due to a complaint by Prince's
record label Universal Music Group. She grew afraid that she would be sued for
thousands of dollars, as some people have been sued for sharing hundreds of songs
over peer-to-peer file-sharing sites like Kazaa. See id. Then she became angry, filed a
response with YouTube that got her video placed back on the site, and filed a lawsuit
against Universal in federal court seeking damages for misrepresentation of copyright
infringement and interference with contract. See id. She remarked: "The idea that
putting a little video of your kid up on YouTube can mean you have to go to court,
and maybe declare bankruptcy and lose your house, is just wrong." Catherine
Rampell, Standing Up to Takedown Notices; Web Users Turn the Tables on Copyright Holders,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at DOI. Her complaint was dismissed, but she was allowed
to amend it. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 07-3783, 2008 WL 962102, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008).
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the masses without charge. They have also responded expeditiously to
allegations of infringement and developed filtering technology to
keep repeat postings to as low a level as practically feasible. 29 BitTor-
rent is said to be emblematic of the radically decentralized model of
many Web 2.0 services, with every user capable of becoming a pro-
ducer in a matter of moments, and less surveillance and administra-
tion of the downloading process than, for example, Napster.30 Virtual
worlds, such as City of Heroes, and commons-based content, such as
Wikipedia, have encountered and developed internal procedures to
resolve scores of subtle copyright and trademark disputes every week,
ranging from the scope of permissible copying of historical accounts,
to imitation of comic book and movie characters, to trademark
dilution.3 1
II. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
A. Exclusive Rights
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 197632 (Copyright Act)
governs exclusive rights in works of authorship.3 3 The Copyright Act
provides an author with the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute,
publicly display or publicly perform the work, or to prepare derivative
works based upon it.34 These rights may be implicated by online activ-
29 See Elise Ackerman, Google to Filter YouTube, OAKaAND TRIB., Feb. 24, 2007,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4176/is_20070224/ai_n186388
23 (quoting Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt as saying that "filtering technology
was one of the company's 'highest priorities'").
30 See Barbry, supra note 21, at 99.
31 See, e.g., City of Heroes and City of Villains End User License Agreement (Feb.
2006), http://eu.cityofheroes.com/support/terms.html (stating that NCsoft Europe,
publisher of City of Heroes, "reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to (1) delete or
alter any Customer-created ingame data or (2) terminate any license granted herein,
for any reason whatsoever, including, without limitation, any suspected or actual
infringement of any trademark or trade name right, copyright, or other proprietary
right"); Play NC Legal Notice, http://www.plaync.com/us/help/legal.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 21, 2008) ("NCsoft does not permit ... infringement of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights on its Sites, and NCsoft will remove all User Submissions .. .if properly
notified ... without prior notice.").
32 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
33 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006).
34 Id. § 106.
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ities, such as duplicating, imitating, or simulating works; 35 disseminat-
ing of physical or electronic copies by sale, other transfer of
ownership, rental, lease, or lending;36 sending an image of a work to a
material object such as a computer in which the work can be per-
ceived; 37 transmitting a performance of a work to the public by means
of a device or process;3 8 or creating an independent work that incor-
porates, adapts, or constitutes a sequel to the copyrighted work.39
The Treaty on European Union permits the European Council of
Ministers to issue directives, which are binding on the member states
but may be implemented somewhat differently in various member
states. 40 The EU Copyright Directive of 200141 (Copyright Directive)
similarly requires E.U. members to guarantee authors, musicians,
record producers, and movie and television producers the exclusive
rights to reproduce or distribute their works, or communicate them to
the public by wire or wireless communication. 42 Although the issue is
not entirely clear, "communication to the public" is said to extend to
the right to display publicly, publicly perform, or broadcast over the
Internet.43 E.U. member states provide varying levels of derivative
work or "adaptation right" protection.44
35 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 463-64 (1984)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-
473, at 58 (1975)).
36 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "publication"); see also N.Y. Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.4 (2001) (noting the definition of 17 U.S.C. § 106); Per-
fect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 718 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 17
U.S.C. § 106, as amended, prohibits distribution of copies of copyrighted material "by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending" (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 106)).
37 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't,
Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that showing video clips on a website
constitutes copyright infringement).
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also NFL v. Primetime 24Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 12
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that unlicensed transmissions of NFL games to satellite sub-
scribers were public performance sufficient to constitute copyright infringement).
39 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967-69 (9th
Cir. 1992).
40 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 249, 2006 OJ. (C321) 37, 153.
41 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Copyright
Directive].
42 Id. arts. 2-4.
43 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (WIPO), WIPO GUIDE ON THE LICENSING OF
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 35 (2006) [hereinafter WIPO].
44 See PASCAL KAMINA, FILM COPYRIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 217-26, 322-32
(2002).
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B. Fair Use
The exclusive rights guaranteed by copyright law do not extend
to "the fair use of a copyrighted work, '4 5 however. "Fair use" is
defined by statute in the United States to include reproduction for
purposes such as teaching, scholarship, research, criticism, comment,
or news reporting.4 6 Whether any particular use is "fair" is deter-
mined by reference to several factors, specifically: whether the use is
commercial or nonprofit, what type of work is made use of, the
amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used, and the
effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the work.4
7
For example, television owners who recorded copyrighted movies and
television programs on videocassettes for viewing at a more conve-
nient time engaged in a fair use that had no demonstrable detrimen-
tal effect on copyright owners. 48 Similarly, parody of a copyrighted
work is a creative, "transformative" use that may be fair despite com-
mercial motives, depending on the effect of a particular parody on the
licensing market for the original.4 9
The Copyright Directive also permits E.U. members to create stat-
utory exceptions and limitations on copyright that do not supplant
the main market for a work. For example, it allows exceptions or limi-
tations to a copyright holder's reproduction and communication
rights, assuming appropriate credit is provided, for purposes includ-
ing: "incidental inclusion" of one work in another work; non-commer-
cial illustration of information for teaching or scientific research;
library terminals reproducing or communicating portions of books or
movies; news reporting or broadcasting; quotations in a criticism or
review "in accordance with fair practice"; caricature or parody; dissem-
ination of information concerning political speeches and "public lec-
tures or similar works"; official or religious celebrations; public
architecture or sculpture; a demonstration or repair of equipment;
and "certain other cases of minor importance where [non-digital]
exceptions or limitations already exist under national law." 50
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55
(1984).
49 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
50 Copyright Directive, supra note 41, art. 5(3)(o).
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C. Other Exceptions to Copyright
The Copyright Act contains several other limitations on copyright
designed to implement Congress' public policy objectives to preserve
specific corporations, industries, and technologies from litigation and
licensing fees that threaten to become excessive in the absence of spe-
cial immunities. Employers, for example, are exempt from the
requirement that they license their employees' works in writing for
commercial use or face copyright infringement suits; 51 the law instead
vests the copyright directly in the employer, even without a contract
specifying as much, under the fiction that the work was "made for
hire. '52 Libraries and archives enjoy immunity for their role in the
reproduction and distribution of books, articles, and recorded audio
to library patrons, and for the reproduction and distribution of up to
three copies of a work for preservation purposes or transfer to
another library or archive. 53 Used book, music, and movie sellers ben-
efit from the limitation of copyright to the "first sale," and refusal of
any resale royalty right to the copyright owner.54 Musical composi-
tions are subject to a statutory license that precludes songwriters from
preventing record labels from making new arrangements of their
songs as long as they pay a set fee.5 5 Owners and operators of radio,
cable television, and satellite radio and television facilities benefit
from exemptions and statutory licenses that likewise stop copyright
holders from exercising the sort of control they do over books. 56 Mak-
51 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
52 Id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire"); id. § 201(b) (establishing employ-
ers, rather than actual creators, as authors of works "made for hire"); see also Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1989) (laying out four criteria
to define "work for hire").
53 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(b)-(c) (2006); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can
Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of Digital Archiving, 91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 1013-18
(2007) (detailing the "complex and highly nuanced set of rules" contained in the
library reproduction exception of section 108 of the Copyright Act).
54 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 177 (2006).
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2) (2006); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 108 (1976)
(stating that absence of statutory license would place, for example, background music
producers "at a great competitive disadvantage with [copyright owners], allow dis-
crimination, and destroy . . . businesses"); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 55-58
(2004) (describing laws governing rights of recording artists).
56 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111, 112, 114 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); 37 C.F.R § 260.2(b)
(2006); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89, 361 (1976) (discussing the limits on
liability of cable television providers for copyright infringement); ROGER A. GORMAN,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COPYRIGHT LAW 110-16 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the ability of
actors in the music industry to reproduce copyrighted works); LESSIG, supra note 54,
53-61; 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.14[A] (2005) (discuss-
ing the lack of an exclusive performance right in sound recordings).
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ers of digital audio home recording devices also receive special treat-
ment in the form of a prohibition on copyright suits. 57 Finally,
webcasters qualify for a statutory license of about one-thousandth of
one dollar for every time a user listens to a song, 58 a rate that may
seem low but that actually dwarfs the royalties paid by traditional or
satellite radio.59
The Copyright Directive also authorizes a number of analogous
exceptions. These include reproductions by: network intermediaries
to allow third persons to transmit information to one another; natural
persons for private noncommercial use assuming fair compensation in
the aggregate to copyright owners; libraries, universities, schools, and
archives for purposes other than "direct or indirect economic or com-
mercial advantage"; broadcasters making recordings of other broad-
casters' works and preserving such works in archives, hospitals or
prisons; and users of sheet music in certain circumstances. 60
III. OPTING OUT OF THE INTERNET IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Early Cases: Threats of "Unreasonable" Liability
The Copyright Act, standing alone, provides little support for the
contention that Internet companies should be held liable for index-
ing or hosting webpages or other user-generated content, or for main-
taining databases summarizing the contents of libraries, Internet
users' hard drives, or other vast troves of information. Nothing in the
Copyright Act makes a company liable for the actions of its customers
or other persons. 61 By contrast, the Patent Act 62 does establish liabil-
ity for contributing to or inducing infringement by another,63 indicat-
57 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-873, pt. 1, at 24 (1992)
(explaining the breadth of the § 1008 prohibition on copyright suits).
58 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 114; see also Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings:
Final Rule and Order, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,096 (2007) (setting forth commercial
webcaster royalties of $.0014 per play for 2008 and $.0018 for 2009); John C. Dvorak,
Killing Internet Radio, PC MAc., Mar. 4, 2002, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,
4212,00.asp (describing "the 0.07-cent royalty proposed for the commercial broadcast-
ers who do Internet broadcasting, versus the 0.14-cent royalty for those who do
Internet-only broadcasting" as a conspiracy orchestrated by the radio stations).
59 The legislation obliging webcasters to pay special royalties to record labels does
not apply to traditional radio broadcasters, who pay no such royalties. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(b).
60 Copyright Directive, supra note 41, arts. 5(1)-(2).
61 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434, 439
(1984).
62 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
63 See id. §271(b)-(c).
2oo8]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ing that Congress knew how, but refused, to establish similar liability
for persons or companies facilitating copyright infringement.6 4 Simi-
larly, section 107 of the Copyright Act suggests that many of the core
uses of the Internet-to send or receive information for research,
scholarship, education, news reporting, criticism, and "comment"-
are the archetypal "fair uses" that are "not an infringement of copy-
right. '65 At the time that the Copyright Act was enacted, courts
understood that the reproduction of elements of copyrighted works in
order to create an index of them is a fair use, because it is an enter-
prise that may "save researchers a considerable amount of time and,
thus, facilitate the public interest in the dissemination of informa-
tion."66 Likewise, they held that the widespread photocopying of
copyrighted books and journals in their entirety was a fair use because
the free dissemination of information is in the public interest and
advances the progress of the arts and sciences. 67
Despite the sharp distinction drawn in the Copyright Act between
informational and entertaining uses, and between one person's
actions and those of another, in the 1980s and 1990s the federal
courts increasingly imposed liability for efforts to improve access to
information, and expanded the scope of secondary liability for
infringement. 68 The imposition of such new forms of liability
expanded in several stages. First, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,69 the Sony case, the Supreme Court endorsed a series
of lower court decisions holding that the operators of entertainment
64 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35, 440 (contrasting the Copyright Act, which "does
not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another," with the
Patent Act, which holds contributory actors liable for infringement); cf. Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1994) (declining
to recognize aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, because Court's review of related statutes revealed that "Congress knew
how to impose aiding and abetting liability," but had not expressly done so).
65 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
66 N.Y. Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J.
1977); see also Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 6001, 1984
WL 2119, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1984), affd, 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986)
("[C]ommercial interest does not alone defeat a fair use defense .... [I]n making
available needed . . . information, [plaintiff] is performing a public function which
clearly brings it within the ambit of the first requirement for fair use protection."
(citations omitted)).
67 See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Ct. Cl.
1973), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
68 For a nice overview on the fair use principles announced in the cases discussed
below, see Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1087, 1092-1107
(2007).
69 464 U.S. 417.
[VOL. 84:1
OPTING OUT OF THE INTERNET
facilities or events such as concerts, dance halls, cocktail lounges, race-
tracks, or radio stations could be liable for contributing to or profiting
from the infringement of their subcontractors, while remaining some-
what unclear about whether its decision would apply to the operators
of facilities for research or information such as libraries, photocopy-
ing equipment, or computer networks. 70 Second, the Supreme Court
in 1985 reached the surprising conclusion that a political magazine
could not paraphrase and quote as it wished from a former Presi-
dent's political memoirs to comment upon his presidency. 7' The
Court relied heavily in its opinion on a case involving the screenplay
for a motion picture about a high-society murder, thereby continuing
the unfortunate aspect of the Sony case to collapse informational and
entertaining copies. 72 Third, lower court cases in the 1990s began to
hold that computer and Internet services could be liable for informa-
tion uploaded or transferred by their users. In so finding, these courts
combined the doctrine of contributory or vicarious infringement of
copyright from the videocassette case with the overly narrow construc-
tion of fair use articulated in the presidential memoirs case. 73
70 Id. at 437 (citing, inter alia, Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse
Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d
Cir. 1938); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th
Cir. 1929); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo.
1977); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
71 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985).
72 See id. at 568-69 (1985); see also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309
U.S. 390, 406 (1940) (holding that a copyright holder may recover all the proceeds of
a performance in violation of the copyright, even where the copyrighted material is
only a small part of the final performance).
73 See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (hold-
ing that a computer network operator is "liable if he knew of the users' infringing
actions, and substantially participated by inducing, causing or materially contributing
to the users' infringing conduct," and that the network's "role in the copying, includ-
ing providing facilities, direction, knowledge, encouragement, and seeking profit,
amounts to a prima facie case of contributory copyright infringement" (citing Relig-
ious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc. (Netcom 1), 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995))); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma (Lerma I), 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569, 1574-75 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding that a critic of Scientology
who posted its relevant documents to the Internet did not engage in fair use where he
added little or no commentary or categorization to the documents); Netcom I, 907 F.
Supp. at 1373 ("Liability for participation in the infringement will be established
where the defendant, 'with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another'" (quoting Gershwin, 443
F.2d at 1162)); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1524-28
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One of the first large entities to attempt to opt out of the Internet
with respect to its copyrighted works was the Church of Scientology,
which achieved mixed results for its efforts. Scientology officials
promise to solve "most human problems" by revealing to the group's
members purportedly secret teachings showing that many emotional
or psychological problems "can be traced to lingering spirits of an
extraterrestrial people massacred by their ruler, Xenu, over 75 million
years ago."'74 They have earned hundreds of millions of dollars per
year selling access to various teachings, documents, and narratives of
extraterrestrial activity. 75
Scientology leaders alleged that the religion's critics infringed
copyrights when exercising their free speech rights, and initially sub-
jected these critics to a harsh campaign of privacy violations in the
course of enforcing these copyrights. Federal marshals, and the
Scientology private investigators that they brought with them,
searched the critics' computer hard drives and private papers, seizing
their computer and paper files for copying and retention by
Scientology officials. 76 Federal judges later indicated that these
searches and seizures may not have been necessary or appropriate.
One declared: "The court is disturbed by the possibility that [the
Scientologists] copied the entirety of [a] hard drive onto a tape for
examination at their leisure .... [Without] consent . . . this would
constitute a significant intrusion into [its owner's] private affairs that
was not justified .... 77
Scientology sued Dennis Ehrlich and its other critics in an effort
to suppress their exposure of damaging, but supposedly "secret" and
copyrighted, documents. Mr. Erlich's case resulted in significant deci-
(D. Colo. 1995) (stating that scanning documents onto a computer for private
research was a fair use, but distributing them over the Internet might not be under
Sony in the absence of significant commentary or transformation); Playboy Enters. v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
562; Sony, 464 U.S. at 451) (stating that the owner of a computer network infringed
copyright by selling access to users who uploaded allegedly infringing content).
74 Lerma I, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
75 See Richard Behar, The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power, TIME, May 6, 1991, at
50-57 (detailing history and activities of the Church of Scientology and arguing that
the organization falsely presents itself as a religion in order to perpetuate a "ruthless
global scam").
76 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Commc'n Servs., Inc. (Netcom II),
923 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
77 Id. at 1264 n.39 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Lucy Morgan, At Home: Critics Public
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sions by a federal court on the liability of online intermediaries for
copyright infringement, and received coverage from CNN and the
New York Times for its implications on the rights of Internet users to
quote from or reproduce a copyright holder's own damning words in
order to discredit its message. 78 Other Scientology critics helped to
establish significant precedents or drew noteworthy publicity to the
ways in which civil laws ranging from IP to defamation may censor
Internet speech. 79 Most important, however, was the conclusion of
Judge Ronald Whyte in the Northern District of California, which cov-
ers Silicon Valley, that Netcom's networks "do no more than operate
or implement a system that is essential if [its] messages are to be
widely distributed. There is no need to construe the [Copyright] Act
to make all of these parties infringers. °80 Judge Whyte analogized
ISPs to telephone companies who are not liable for infringing calls. 8 '
As with the telephone companies, an ISP's "lack of knowledge will be
found reasonable and there will be no liability for contributory
infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works on
its system. "82
B. The "Safe Harbors" of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998, Congress established several additional copyright
exemptions that were necessary to ensure the continued operation
and growth of the Internet. In the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
78 See Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1361; Rose Aguilar, No Answers in Scientology Case,
CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 5, 1996, http://www.news.com/No-answers-in-Scientology-
case/2100-1023_3-220158.html?tag=item; Don Knapp, Scientologists Claim Victory in
Internet Copyright Lawsuit, CNN.coM, Nov. 28, 1995, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/
9511/scientology/index.html; Deborah Shapley, Corporate Web Police Hunt Down E-
Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at D5.
79 See Lerma II, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575-76; Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1519 (D. Colo. 1995); Religious Tech Ctr. v.
Lerma (Lerma 1), 897 F. Supp. 260, 261-63 (E.D. Va. 1995); Matt Hines, Scientology
Loss Keeps Hyperlinks Legal CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 8, 2003), http://www.news.com/
2100-1028_3-5072581.html; Troy Wolverton, Amazon to Restore Scientology Title, CNET
NEWS.COM (May 20, 1999), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-226171.html.
80 Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1369-70. The court referred to Usenet messages,
rather than Internet messages, but Usenet could be fairly characterized as part of the
Internet, a global network of computer networks. See Bryan Pfaffenberger, "A Stand-
ing Wave in the Web of our Communications": Usenet and the Socio-Technical Construction of
Cyberspace Values, in FROM USENET TO COWEBs 20, 20 (Christopher Lueg & Danyel
Fisher eds., 2003).
81 Netcom , 907 F. Supp. at 1368-69, 1370 n.12, 1374.
82 Id. at 1374. The court also stated that Netcom does not invite copyright
infringement based on offering its users "regulation-free Internet access." Id. at 1377.
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(DMCA) of 1998,83 Congress enacted several "limitations of liability"
that are intended to apply even if an ISP "is found to be liable under
existing principles of law."'8 4 These safe harbors largely mirrored the
conclusions of Judge Whyte in the Netcom I case.85 As a senator and
key architect of the DMCA stated:
[T]he potential of the Internet, both as information highway and
marketplace, depends on its speed and capacity. Without clarifica-
tion of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the nec-
essary investment to fulfill that potential. In the ordinary course of
their operations service providers must engage in all kinds of acts
that expose them to potential copyright infringement liability.
For example, service providers must make innumerable elec-
tronic copies in order simply to transmit information over the
Internet. Certain electronic copies are made to speed up the deliv-
ery of information to users. Other electronic copies are made in
order to host World Wide Web sites. Many service providers engage
in directing users to sites in response to inquiries by users or they
volunteer sites that users may find attractive. Some of these sites
might contain infringing material. In short, by limiting the liability
of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of
services on the Internet will continue to expand.8 6
Another senator who was a driving force behind the DMCA
explained that he "did not come to Washington to vote for a bill that
could be used to ban the next generation of recording equipment,"
and emphasized that "nothing in the bill should be read to make it
unlawful to produce and use the next generation of computers or
VCRs or whatever future device will render one or the other of these
familiar devices obsolete." 87 He declared that "safe harbor" should be
construed broadly to encourage "entrepreneurship" and the develop-
ment of "consumer oriented products."88
Under the DMCA, no copyright action may lie for damages
against companies providing Internet connectivity or transmitting or
routing material over the Internet, and injunctive relief against them
83 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 17, 28, 35 U.S.C.).
84 H.R. REP. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
85 MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFtWARE AND INTERNET LAW 741 (3d ed. 2006); see also
Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1377 (explaining that even if a copyright holder's exclusive
rights were violated, there would not be an infringement if limited by a defense of
"fair use").
86 144 CONG. REc. 9234 (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
87 Id. at 9240 (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
88 Id. at 9239.
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must be limited to a court order requiring the termination of the
Internet access of a subscriber or account holder adjudged to have
engaged in infringing activity, or reasonable steps to block access from
within the United States to a specific online location outside the
United States adjudged to be infringing.8 9 For certain companies pro-
viding caching, or the "temporary storage of material on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider," copy-
right liability is limited to injunctive relief to terminate access, block
access to a particular site, or minimally burdensome measures to pre-
vent or restrain infringement.90
The last two exemptions involve companies, such as Google or
Yahoo!, that provide "information location tools" including indexes,
hyperlinks, and directories;9I and companies such as YouTube that
"host" or store material on the Internet at the behest of their users. 92
For these categories of companies, liability is limited to injunctive
relief similar to that available against "caching"93 on the condition
that the company doing the hosting or storing of material "does not
have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the mate-
rial on the system or network is infringing," is not "aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent," or "upon
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove,
or disable access to, the material. ' 94 The company doing the hosting
or storing may lose its exemption if it "receive[s] a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity. '95
The obligation to remove or disable access to material claimed to be
infringing is limited to situations in which the copyright owner pro-
vides a notification in a signed writing of the claimed infringement
that includes the contact information of the complainant, a list of the
works claimed to have been infringed, information reasonably suffi-
cient to permit the company to locate the material that is claimed to
89 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006); id. § 512(j)(1)(B); see also Ellison v. Robertson,
357 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that DMCA safe harbors include
.transitory digital network communications").
90 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2006); id. § 512(j) (1) (A); see also Ellison, 357 F.3d at
1077 (noting that DMCA safe harbors include "system caching").
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006).
92 See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1077.
93 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)-(d) (2006); see also id. § 512(j)(1)(A) (describing the scope
of injunctive relief under DCMA).
94 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A); see also id. § 512(d)(1) (using similar, but not identical,
language to describe the liability of search websites).
95 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B); see also id. § 512(d)(2) (using identical language to
describe liability of search websites).
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be infringing, and a "statement that the complaining party has a good
faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is
not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law." 96
C. An Emerging Consensus That Copyright Holders Must Opt In to
the Internet?
In 1999, a court issued a ruling that would incur substantial criti-
cism for its secure-an-opt-in-or-suffer-copyright-liability model of the
Internet and World Wide Web. In Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Light-
house Ministry, Inc.,97 the court stated that browsing a website may
reproduce a copyrighted work by sending it to the memory of the
browser's computer, and that "in the absence of ownership of the cop-
yright or express permission by licence [sic], such an act constitutes
copyright infringement."98 The court did not actually conclude that
copyright infringement had occurred, however, only that the plaintiff
had shown a sufficient likelihood of proving it at trial to warrant pre-
liminary relief in its favor.99 Before concluding that this likelihood of
success existed, the court focused on the fact that the defendants had
previously been ordered to remove the allegedly infringing content
from their site, that they had then "actively encouraged the infringe-
ment of plaintiffs copyright," and urged others to engage in "the cop-
ying and posting of copies of the allegedly infringing material on
other websites."'100
The decision was problematic in several respects. First, it failed to
account for the existing precedents on contributory and vicarious lia-
bility from Sony to the Netcom litigation. Another court cited these
precedents in dismissing a copyright infringement claim premised
upon hyperlinks to allegedly infringing content, noting that linking
does not copy the linked-to site, and that "linking 'is capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses' and thus cannot support a claim for con-
96 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); see also id. § 512(d)(2) (shielding a service provider for
liability if it receives no financial benefit attributable to the infringement, subject to
other requirements); id. § 512(c) (1) (providing that a service provider is not liable by
reason of storage of copyrighted material by a user, in certain circumstances); id.
§ 512(d) (1) (providing that a service provider is not liable for linking to copyrighted
material if it does not, inter alia, have actual knowledge of the infringement).
97 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
98 Id. at 1294 (citing MA Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518
(9th Cir. 1993)).
99 Id. at 1292-93.
100 Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1294-95.
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tributory infringement . .. ".101 Second, the Intellectual Reserve court
failed to recognize that a hyperlink to another site does not reproduce
or display that site within the context of the linking site, a premise
utilized by another court to reject copyright liability for hyperlinks
erected without permission.' 0 2 Third, and most importantly, the
court threatened to chill the development of the Internet and Web by
adopting a rule that linking equals, or contributes to, copyright
infringement. It was "frightening" in that "the court gave no consider-
ation to the fair use (and First Amendment) concerns underlying the
dispute.' 10 3 These concerns are critical because a "link is merely a
reference, like a footnote, and no one (one hopes) would contend
that a footnote identifying where an allegedly infringing work may be
found makes its author contributorily liable for copyright
infringement. '" 10 4
In 2000, two important cases were decided in which courts held
websites liable for allowing users to access or distribute copyrighted
work whose owners had not authorized its inclusion on the site, or the
Internet for that matter. In Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,'0 5 the
defendants established an Internet discussion forum in which users
could create webpages where newspaper articles could be posted and
criticized or commented upon by the poster or other users. 10 6 The
"Referrer Reports" obtained by the defendants from the websites of
the plaintiff newspapers, who sued for copyright infringement,
showed that tens or even hundreds of Internet users were "referred"
by defendants' hyperlinks to plaintiffs' websites each month.10 7 On
that basis, and given the "transformative" nature of the criticism and
101 Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., No. 98-2958 R EX, 1998 WL 906644, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 1998) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
102 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003
WL 21406289, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
103 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &
ARTS 1, 12 (2000).
104 Id.; see also Mary Anne Bendotoff, Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry, Inc.: Fair Use, the First Amendment, and the Freedom to Link, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 83,
94 (2000) (urging both reading the decision narrowly and treating it as a "warning"
about the threat posed by copyright law to freedom of speech).
105 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
106 Id. at 1455-56.
107 Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply to Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Re Fair Use Issues), at
*10, L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (No.
CV-98-7840), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/courts/freerep/19991101.
html.
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commentary on the plaintiffs' articles posted to their site, the defend-
ants claimed that they facilitated fair uses of the articles.' 0 8 The court
held that the failure to get permission for the use, the copying of the
articles in their entirety, and the "lack of any significant transforma-
tion of the articles" at the time of first posting to defendants' site
meant that defendants were not engaging in fair use. 09 The court
betrayed its indifference to the Internet context and the economics of
online content distribution by equating the distribution of news foot-
age on videotape, which does not refer viewers to the footage creators'
television station, with quotations of newspaper articles on websites
that include hyperlinks to the newspapers' own sites, which does refer
readers and expand the newspaper sites' readership. 110 It com-
pounded the poor analogy by concluding that the plaintiffs' declara-
tions, which according to the court established merely that some of
plaintiffs' articles were available on defendants' sites, also proved that
defendants were not referring visitors to the plaintiffs' sites, a fact that
the declarations did not prove.111 The plaintiffs' own server logs and
internal experts, which established an increase in traffic due to refer-
rals from defendants' site and no evidence of "diversion" of traffic,
actually refuted their conclusory declarations. 12
Similarly, in UMG Recordings v. MP3.com,113 the defendant copied
the plaintiffs' compact discs (CDs) in order to create a digital "locker"
for music. Subscribers to the site could, after verifying that they
owned the CD in question, listen to that CD without copying it to their
hard drives.11 4 The court concluded that MP3.com had infringed the
copyrights in the CDs by failing to request permission for the copying
of the music onto MP3.com's servers. 115  The court rejected
MP3.com's argument that it was merely facilitating a fair use of the
CDs by verifying each user's ownership of a particular CD, and
allowing them to listen to it on their computer rather than on a
stereo, and without having to copy it to the hard drive.'1 6 It empha-
108 Id. at *6-11; see also Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459-64, 1470-71
(reciting and dismissing the "transformative" argument).
109 Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
110 Id. (citing L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 994
(9th Cir. 1998)).
111 See id. at 1470-71.
112 See id. at 1471.
113 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
114 See id. at 350.
115 See id.; see alsoJonathan Band, The Google Libray Project: Both Sides of the Story,
INFO. OUTLOOK, June 1, 2006, at 35, 43 (describing how Google may distinguish its
library project from MP3.com in terms of the transformative nature of the project).
116 See MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350-53.
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sized that "defendant's activities on their face invade plaintiffs' statu-
tory right to license their copyrighted sound recordings to others for
reproduction." 117 But the court failed utterly to grapple with the
implications of new Internet technologies, or the potential benefit of
such a service in making CDs even more useful and valuable.' 18 It
simply mentioned in passing that plaintiffs had taken unspecified
"steps" to license their music for some digital uses, without analyzing
at all whether such licenses would enhance the value of CDs to a
degree comparable to defendant's digital "locker" service. 119 Instead
of coming to terms with how the Internet can improve the marketing
and use of traditional media content, it equated MP3.com with the
copying and selling of television news on videotapes to paying sub-
scribers, a wholly inapposite comparison. 120 MP3.com ultimately set-
tled by paying over $150 million in statutory damages to the copyright
owners, 1 2 1 an unconstitutionally large $25,000 per CD. 1 22
117 Id. at 352.
118 See id. (refusing to analyze the "positive impact of defendant's activities on
plaintiffs' prior market" because, whatever it is, it "in no way frees defendant to usurp
a ...market").
119 Id.
120 See id. at 351 (citing L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd. 149 F.3d
987, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1998)).
121 SeeJohn Borland & Jim Hu, MP3.com Buy: The Taming of a Generation, CNET
NEWS.COM (May 21, 2001), http://news.cnet.com/MP3.com-buy-The-taming-of-a-gen-
eration/2100-1023_3-257993.html.
122 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., [1999-2000] Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 28,141, at 32,845 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (considering a range of awards
from $500 to $125,000 per CD before settling on a figure of $25,000 after considering
balancing factors). The amount assessed was likely unconstitutional under more
recent case law because it exceeded plaintiffs' actual damages by a factor greater than
ten times, because plaintiffs offered no proof of actual damages or physical injury, id.
at finding no. 9, and because the average price per CD sold is only $15 or $16. See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("Ourjurispru-
dence and the principles it has now established demonstrate ... that, in practice, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to
a significant degree, will satisfy due process."). The plaintiffs offered no proof of
actual damages or physical injury. See UMG Recordings, [1999-2000] Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) at 32,845; see also Bridgeport Music v.Justin Combs Publ'g, 507 F.3d 470 (6th
Cir. 2007) (striking down a disproportionate punitive damages award for common law
copyright infringement and unfair competition claims); J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly
Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregat-
ing Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REv. 525, 548
(2004) (asserting that noncompensatory damages in this context "heavily outweigh"
the compensatory damages, thus implicating substantive due process).
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D. The Shift Toward an Opt-Out Copyright System in the Napster Case
In the celebrated case A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 123 a fed-
eral appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs, all copyright owners, had
to provide the defendant, a provider of a music search engine and file-
sharing software, with notice of the specific works infringed on the
defendants' search engine before the defendant would be obligated
to remove those works. The district court had initially addressed a
request by several record labels and movie studios for a preliminary
injunction restraining a distributor of peer-to-peer file-sharing
software from providing the program, search engine, and server-based
directory of user's hard drives that people used to connect to one
another's computers and transfer song files. 124 Napster had as many
as 75 million users who shared up to 10,000 songs per second. 125
Unlike MP3.com or Free Republic, however, Napster was not sued for
having copied any works itself, but for incurring secondary or contrib-
utory/vicarious liability for alleged infringements by its users.1 26
The district court enjoined Napster, pending trial, from "facilitat-
ing" the copying, downloading, distribution, or transmission of the
plaintiffs' music absent "express permission of the rights owner."' 27
The court stated: "Defendant must insure that no work owned by
plaintiffs which neither defendant nor Napster users have permission
to use or distribute is uploaded or downloaded on Napster."128
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially
affirmed and partially reversed the terms of the preliminary injunc-
tion and remanded for further proceedings to modify the injunc-
tion.129 Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit did not dispense
with the legal requirement that a company charged with contributing
to the infringement of another have "actual knowledge" of the spe-
123 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
124 See id. at 901-02.
125 See id. at 902.
126 Compare UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350-53
(considering a situation where defendant copied CDs onto its servers), and L.A.
Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1461 n.38 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(defendants posted newspaper articles to their website themselves), with Napster/, 114
F. Supp. at 897-902 (Napster users established direct connections with one another to
share files), andJOSEPH MENN, ALL THE RAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN FANNING'S
NAPSTER 34-35 (2003) (emphasizing that Napster did not itself store music on its
servers to be downloaded by users).
127 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
128 Id.
129 See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
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cific act of infringement, rather than there being merely a general
climate of infringement. 130
The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs had only established a likeli-
hood of success on their claims because Napster, "'with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.'" 3 1 The court declared that it would
be entirely improper to, as the district court suggested, "impute the
requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer
file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copy-
rights." 132 It reasoned that "absent any specific information which
identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be
liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of
the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted information." 133
Regarding the district court's holding that Napster could be
enjoined from benefiting financially from acts of infringement by
users that it had the ability to prevent, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
district court's decision to place the entire burden on Napster to
police its system for infringing files. Even without determining that
Napster qualified for the DMCA's safe harbor protections, the court
imposed part of "the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster
of copyrighted works and files containing such works available on the
Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable access to the
offending content."'1 4 The court held "that if a computer system
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system
and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows
130 Compare Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (rejecting the defendants' argument
that because titles in the directory did not distinguish between infringing and nonin-
fringing files, the defendant could not know it was infringing), with Napster 1, 239
F.3d at 1019-21 ("We ... will not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster
merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs'
copyrights.").
131 NapsterIl, 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.3d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). The court made this finding
despite the fact that "[t] he instant appeal occurs at an early point in the proceedings
and 'the fully developed factual record may be materially different from that before
the district court ... ' Id. at 1021 (omission in original) (quoting Sports Form, Inc.
v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982)).
132 Id. at 1020-21. Compare id. (refusing to enjoin "simply because a computer
network allows for infringing use" without a determination that an operator has suffi-
cient knowledge of the infringing uses), with Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916-19
(downplaying the potentially noninfringing uses of Napster as unimportant com-
pared to the volume of infringing uses).
133 Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1021.
134 Id. at 1027.
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of and contributes to direct infringement."1 35 The court refused to
rule on whether Napster could claim the benefit of the DMCA, which,
it said, may require copyright owners to give ISPs that host or index
infringing material official notice of infringing activity in order to con-
vey "knowledge or awareness of [the] activity," and give the ISPs' copy-
right compliance procedures a chance to work, before instituting
litigation. 136
After the appeal, the district court entered a modified injunction
requiring Napster to remove files from its directory and search engine
once the plaintiffs provided the name of an infringing file, a certifi-
cate of copyright ownership for the work, and other information. 137
That the district court established an opt-out framework is apparent
from the terms of the injunctive relief. It obliged the plaintiffs to use
reasonable measures to identify particular works or files by title and
artist, placed the burden on some plaintiffs to identify which versions
of songs they owned the rights in, and required Napster to compare
plaintiffs' lists of works or files against its own search results. 138 The
court ordered Napster to remove the files identified by plaintiffs' sub-
missions and its own searches from its search results. 139 The court
later expanded the injunction after Napster failed to comply with the
modified injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the expanded
injunction because Napster had not done all it could "to maximize the
effectiveness of [its] filtering mechanism."' 40 Thus, only after the
plaintiffs had clearly opted out of the Napster search engine, and the
defendant had repeatedly failed to comply, was it found liable for its
users' conduct.
Despite the courts' insistence on an opt-out model of copyright
enforcement, 14 1 the decision in Napster has been criticized on several
135 Id. at 1021.
136 Id. at 1025. The court quoted authorities declaring that "'Congress intended
to provide some relief from vicarious liability,'" id. (quoting Charles S. Wright, Actual
Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability far Copyright Infringement into the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1031 (2000)), and that the
DMCA "'protect[s] qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief
for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105-
90, at 40-41 (1998)).
137 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II1), 284 F.3d 1091, 1095-96
(9th Cir. 2002).
138 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2186, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
139 See id. at *5-6.
140 Napster Ill, 284 F.3d at 1098.
141 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1237-39 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
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grounds. First, the district court announced a "zero tolerance" stan-
dard for infringement of properly noticed works. This standard has
no place in high-technology markets where, as Napster correctly
pointed out, courts should avoid "second-guessing 'major technologi-
cal innovations [that] alter the market for copyrighted materials."' 142
As Professor Lessig explained:
If 99.4 percent [compliance, which Napster achieved,] is not good
enough, then this is a war on file-sharing technologies, not a war on
copyright infringement. There is no way to assure that a p2 p system
is used 100 percent of the time in compliance with the law, any
more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of the VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines... are used in compliance with the
law .... The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the
benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they
serve, simply to assure that there are zero copyright infringements
caused by p2p.
143
Second, the Napster decision punished the company for, after
obtaining knowledge of specific infringing files, contributing to the
infringement of those files by making its software "networked" and
"frequently updated," and terminating the accounts of some alleged
infringers in a way that demonstrated its right and ability to control
infringement by its users. 144 So-called "stand-alone" devices like the
videocassette recorder in the Sony case, as well as decentralized net-
works like Kazaa and Grokster that create user-maintained directories
and make it more difficult to monitor infringement, would be
immune from claims of infringement under the decision, despite an
equivalent or greater potential for infringement. -4 5
Third, and most importantly, the Napster decision facilitated an
apparent collusive strategy between music labels to control the distri-
142 Brief of Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellant Napster, Inc. at 63, Napster 1II,
284 F.3d 1091 (Nos. 01-15998, 01-16003, 01-16011 and 01-16308) (quoting Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984)), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/napster/npstbrfD80801 .pdf.
143 LESSIG, supra note 54, at 74.
144 See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 451, 480 (2002) ("[T]he
Napster decision suggests that the more free-standing the technology, the more likely
it will be to escape under Sony; however, in a networked world in which software is
frequently updated by providers, and even devices... may be part of a network, one is
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bution system for their products. 146 The major record labels rejected
a $1 billion offer from Napster to license their music, instead getting
together to offer their own service "that lacked just about everything
that makes online music downloads appealing.' 47 When that failed,
they licensed music for online distribution by Roxio (which acquired
Napster), Apple, and other firms, but at licensing rates so high that
the services lost money despite significant revenues.148
E. The Internet Matures: Courts Move to an Opt-Out Copyright System
Since Napster, fair use and other defenses are widely available to
Internet companies that do not disregard clear opt-outs by copyright
holders. Courts have become more sophisticated about the Internet
and its high-profile companies' operations. As a result, leading cases
decided since Napster have required that a search engine must be put
on notice of specific instances of infringement before being held lia-
ble for its own conduct, or for that of its users. With respect to a
search engine's own conduct, the most important case is Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp.149 In that case, a search engine for photographs and other
146 See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig. (Napster IV), 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087,
1108-10 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (granting Napster's motion for a continuance on the basis
of its plausible charges that record companies were colluding to prevent the entry of
other parties into the online music distribution business); see also Fagin et al., supra
note 144, at 464-69, 492-93 (suggesting an anticompetitive potential of recording
companies' business and litigation strategies); Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and
Fair Use: iTunesfor Authors, or Napsterfor Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 154-57 (2006)
(discussing the recording industry's fledgling attempts to set up an online music dis-
tribution business, the Justice Department's initial investigation into possible anticom-
petitive behavior by the recording industry, and the Napster IV case).
147 Anna Wilde Mathews et al., The Music Industry Finally Online, But Few Listen,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2002, at Al; see alsojim Hu, Record Labels Scoff at Napster's $1 Billion
Plan, CNET NEWS.COM (Feb. 21, 2001), http://news.cnet.com/Record-labels-scoff-at-
Napsters-l-billion-plan/2100-1023_3-252921.html (reporting record labels' rejection
of Napster's offer).
148 In 2002, Roxio acquired Napster. SeeJohn Borland, Roxio Closes Napster Asset
Buy, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 27, 2002), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-975627.
html. Napster incurred over $165 million dollars in losses between 2004 and 2007.
Napster, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 (Jun. 6, 2007) (combining net losses
from April 1, 2004, through March 31, 2007, Napster lost $165,960,000). Apple
reportedly operated iTunes as a "loss leader for iPod," seeJon Newton, The iTunes
Phenomenon, P2P Networks and Music Lite, E-COMMERCE TIMES (July 7, 2004), http://
www.ecommercetimes.com/story/34986.html?wlc=1219702121. The Financial Times
reported in April 2007 that: "For Apple, music has been a loss leader to promote the
sale of its iPod MP3 players . . . ." Emiko Terazono, EMI's iTunes Copyright Decision
Divides the Music Industry, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at 22.
149 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
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images reproduced as many images available on the Internet as its
software could find and index, and then distributed and displayed the
images to users searching for images on the Internet in thumbnail or
reduced-scale form. 150 The court held that the search engine was not
liable for copying and creating the thumbnail previews of the plain-
tiffs works where it deleted them as soon as the plaintiff complained,
and its search engine was a fair use because it improved access to
information on the Internet by making images searchable. 151 The
case supports the idea that "providing access to infringing websites" is
still "transformative" and "does not amount to an abuse of the good
faith and fair dealing underpinnings of the fair use doctrine." 152
With respect to software providers' liability for their users' con-
duct, the Supreme Court made it clear in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.153 that the most important question is whether
the provider "acted with a purpose to cause copyright violations,' 115 4
including by failing to block specific copyrighted files after "it received
threatening notice from the copyright holders. ' 155 The court reaf-
firmed its conclusion in Sony that "mere knowledge of infringing
potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough . . . to
subject a distributor to liability," so that "purposeful infringement" is
necessary. 156 Indeed, the defendants in Grokster declared that most
downloads using their software were infringing; the defendants were
provided with lists of eight million specific copyrighted files they were
accused of infringing by the plaintiffs and distributed advertisements
and guidance on how to download and play popular copyrighted
music and movies.1 57 The plaintiffs and the United States as amicus
curiae, speaking through both the acting Solicitor General of the
United States and the General Counsel of the U.S. Copyright Office,
underlined the defendants' knowledge:
According to petitioners, moreover, the evidence shows that respon-
dents' networks have been "designed and modified to best enable
150 See id. at 815-16 (describing the operation of the Arriba image search engine).
151 See id. at 820 ("This first factor [purpose and character of the use] weighs in
favor of Arriba due to the public benefit of the search engine and the minimal loss of
integrity to Kelly's images.").
152 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Kelly and distinguishing Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment,
Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198-200 (3d Cir. 2003)).
153 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
154 See id. at 938.
155 Id. at 926-27.
156 Id. at 937.
157 See id. at 923, 938.
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and facilitate the infringement of copyrighted works," and that
respondents have marketed their networks as optimally suited for
infringement, such as by emphasizing the anonymity of copying and
advertising how many tracks a search for Madonna retrieved on
StreamCast as opposed to a legitimate service. Petitioners indicate
that respondents "advised their users how to download copyrighted
works, including The Matrix, Blair Witch Project, Tomb Raider, Pearl
Harbor, Lord of the Rings, Resident Evil, and Big Fat Liar," and
"included in promotional materials search results featuring The
Eagles Greatest Hits... as well as music by Sting, Puff Daddy, Shania
Twain, Bruce Springsteen, Miles Davis, Carlos Santana, and John
Lee Hooker."
158
In the absence of such detailed knowledge and open encourage-
ment of infringement, linking, facilitating access to, and even defend-
ing the legality in court of infringing material made available over an
ISP's system does not implicate the inducing infringement rule of
Grokster.159 As the Ninth Circuit declared in 2007, absent such promo-
tion or advertising of infringement, Grokster left unchanged the
requirement that a "computer system operator" have "actual knowl-
edge of specific infringing material" on its system, and fail to "take
simple measures" to remove it.1 60
158 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 29,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-
480), 2003 WL 22794496, at *10, *19 (citations omitted) (quoting Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants' Opening Brief at 8, 28, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894, 03-56236, 03-55901).
159 See Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir.
2007) (finding no ISP liability pursuant to the Grokster standard under these circum-
stances). As the court in Lycos stated:
Even assuming arguendo that active inducement could negate Section 230
immunity, it is clear that UCS has not alleged any acts by Lycos that come
even close to constituting the "clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster" unlawful activity that would be necessary to find active
inducement. UCS relies in part on . . .standard elements of web sites "with
[both] lawful and unlawful potential," and [which], without more, cannot
form the basis to find inducement. UCS's complaint also cites the fact that
Lycos has taken legal action to protect its subscribers, including moving to
quash subpoenas and intervening in relevant cases. Actions taken to protect
subscribers' legal rights, however, cannot be construed as inducement of
unlawful activity, and UCS does not allege that Lycos lacked a reasonable
basis for its legal activities.
Id. (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919, 937) (citations omitted).
160 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170-72 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-32); see also Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th
Cir. 2001) (requiring knowledge of specific infringing activities before imposing lia-
bility for contributory infringement on a computer systems operator); Netcom 1, 907 F.
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Courts have applied similar principles of fair use and secondary
liability, as well as the DMCA safe harbors, to hold that operators of
electronic commerce sites that respond to opt-outs by removing ven-
dors' infringing content are not liable for copyright infringement.
When an adult magazine sued Amazon.com and Google for reproduc-
ing, indexing, and displaying, in reduced-size files, its copyrighted
photographs, the courts refused to hold the Internet companies liable
for copyright infringement unless they knew of specific infringing
images and failed to take "simple" steps to prevent users from acces-
sing them.161 The courts reached similar results when the magazine
sued ISPs, Web hosting companies, and credit card processing services
for facilitating the infringement by websites of the magazine's photo-
graphs, holding that as long as they developed reasonable policies for
responding to infringement of specific files, they were protected by
the DMCA and other copyright defenses and limitations. 162 Thus,
Amazon.com is similarly not liable for hosting third parties' products
and notifying customers of where to buy infringing items, as long as it
is not tolerant of specific instances of infringement. 163 Nor can eBay
Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Liability for participation in the infringement
will be established where the defendant, 'with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."'
(quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971)).
161 See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172 ("Google could be held contributorily liable if it
had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search
engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10's copy-
righted works, and failed to take such steps.").
162 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Per-
fect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1110-17 (9th Cir. 2007). The court held in
Visa that Perfect 10 could not sue operators of credit card processing services that
enabled websites to earn profits from infringing reproduction, distribution, and dis-
play of plaintiffs photographs, even though credit card companies "lend their names
and logos to the offending websites and continue to allow their cards to be used to
purchase infringing images despite actual knowledge of the infringement." Visa, 494
F.3d at 802. The defendants did not control the content of infringing sites. Id. at
803. "Dance hall" and other precedents cited by the plaintiff "were developed for a
brick-and-mortar world, and, as the Napster and Grokster courts implicitly recognized
by paying little attention to them, they do not lend themselves well to application in
an electronic commerce context." Id. at 798 n.9. In CCBill, the court held that,
under the DMCA, a service provider qualified as a "safe harbor" if it "has a working
notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-complaint notifications, and
if it does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to
issue such notifications." CCBiM4 488 F.3d at 1109.
163 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104-05 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (immunizing Amazon from copyright infringement by third party shop-
keepers under the DCMA because it did not actually know that specific vendors were
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be found liable for infringing auctions that are readily identifiable by
simple searches on its site, as long as it did not disregard notifications
of specific infringing items.' 64
Other courts have reinforced the principle that ISPs should not
be liable for content that they transmit or host absent knowing fail-
ures to respond to infringement or a direct financial benefit from the
infringement going beyond normal business profits. For example,
even if Google becomes aware that its search engine has indexed, and
is reproducing and displaying preview text or images from, infringing
websites, it does not become liable for infringement by the sites unless
it "can take simple measures to prevent further damage to [the] copy-
righted works, and failed to take such steps." 165 Absent such a pur-
pose to infringe, Google is engaged in fair use. 166
Promptly disabling access to works after receipt of a sufficiently
particularized opt-out request shows good faith and is consistent with
"socially valuable" fair use. 167 Other ISPs never become liable for
infringement, because they simply reproduce and transmit files from
selling infringing items); Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914,
917-18 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (providing a forum for sales of infringing merchandise by
third parties and sending notifications to customers regarding the listing and sale of
infringing items, or providing credit card processing for infringing items, does not
unlawfully contribute to infringement because the defendant did not receive notifica-
tion and opt-out for specific items alleged to be infringing under the DCMA).
164 See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090-93 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(ruling that eBay, an online auction company, was entitled to the benefit of DMCA
safe harbor where plaintiffs notifications of copyright infringement and demand that
defendant cease and desist from infringement did not provide particularized details
on infringing items).
165 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172; see also Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App'x 833,
837 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (preventing the author of a book or article posted to the
Internet, which Google reproduced for archival purposes and allowed others to access
via its Internet service without the author's permission, from suing Google in the
absence of a showing that it disregarded the author's notifications of specific infring-
ing content, or that it had a much more "direct financial interest in the purported
infringing activity").
166 See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165-68 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 815-16, 818-22 (9th Cir. 2003)) (describing search engines' reproduction of
materials as "fair uses" because they do "transformative" work on the materials that
provides a "benefit to the public").
167 See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing Kelly
v. Arriba Soft, Inc., 336 F.3d 811, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also id. at 1122-23
(taking Google's good faith in promptly removing websites plaintiff complained
about from cache as an additional factor in fair use analysis).
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one Internet user to another as a conduit, without retaining copies for
more than a transitory life.' 68
The DMCA safe harbors shield online services in the absence of
the willful or purposeful disregard of copyrights, which courts define
as failure to permit copyright holders to opt out of specific infringing
postings.1 69 The legislative history of the DMCA makes clear that noti-
fications of specific instances of infringement are necessary so that
ISPs do not have to "'make discriminating judgments about potential
copyright infringement[ ].'-"170
168 See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550-51 (4th Cir. 2004)
("When an electronic infrastructure is designed and managed as a conduit of infor-
mation and data that connects users over the Internet, the owner and manager of the
conduit hardly 'copies' the information and data in the sense that it fixes a copy in its
system of more than transitory duration."); cf Hecke v. Clear Channel Commc'ns., Inc.,
[2004-2005 Transfer Book] Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 29,018, at 38,420 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 26, 2005) (holding that a radio network was not liable for its own stations' broad-
cast of an infringing song where the "stations make their own programming deci-
sions" and the radio network did not control those programming decisions).
169 In Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004), the court held that the
ISP could only be liable for postings by its users if it "knew or had reason to know of
the infringing activity taking place" on its network and "materially contributed to that
infringing activity." Id. at 1076-79. The court cast doubt on the plaintiff's evidence
that the defendant "received a direct financial benefit from the copyright infringe-
ment." Id. at 1079. It also held that the defendant was entitled to DMCA safe harbor
protections under section 512(a), and that a reasonablejtry could find it entitled to
the benefit of safe harbor protections under section 512(i) as well. Id. at 1080-81.
See also Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188-89 (D.D.C. 2005) (dis-
missing plaintiffs copyright claims where plaintiffs correspondence with defendant
contained only "vague statements [that were] simply insufficient to put the defend-
ants on notice of the claims against them" or to help them "determine which claims
the plaintiff is asserting"); Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195,
1203-05 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (recognizing that an ISP enjoyed fair use and safe harbor
protections when it hosted a website that republished copyrighted documents in
order to expose problems with electronic voting software); Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp.
2d at 1089-92 (shielding eBay from copyright liability under the DMCA because
plaintiffs notifications of infringing auctions did not identify the infringing items
with specificity); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660, 2002 WL
1997918, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (finding that a trial was needed on the issue
of a website's liability for providing hyperlinks to allegedly infringing music files
where plaintiffs notifications of the alleged infringements and opt-outs "named par-
ticular artists along with specified songs" and provided defendant "with the pages on
MP3Board's own site where the links appeared," and questions remained about
whether defendant's knowledge of infringement precluded the application of the
DMCA safe harbor).
170 Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (2003) (emphasis
added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 58).
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IV. OPTING OUT OF THE INTERNET IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Insofar as most European countries lack a broad, general-purpose
"fair use" exception, it would be surprising if they developed an opt-
out framework for the Internet, as U.S. courts have done for the most
part.171 Nevertheless, several lines of authority exist for the proposi-
tion that ISPs should not be liable for Internet content in the absence
of a decision to disregard a notification of infringement, opt-out, or
other clear warnings.
A. The Electronic Commerce Directive: Copyright Exemptions to Promote the
Growth of Free Expression and the Internet
The European Community's Electronic Commerce Directive
(ECD) 172 erects safe harbors for online intermediaries that are similar
to those in the DMCA. The ECD's recitals note that the free develop-
ment and circulation of information services throughout the Euro-
pean Community is guaranteed by the basic principle of freedom of
expression, as set forth in the Article 10(1) of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR). 173 These information services, however, are threatened by
legal "obstacles" including "divergences in legislation" and "legal
uncertainty as to which national rules apply to such services."'174
Like the DMCA, the ECD stipulates that providing access to a
computer network or transmitting information over it, including
171 See Alain Strowel & Jan Corbet, Belgium, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE, at BEL-53 (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 2007) (dis-
tinguishing fair use in the United States from copyright exceptions in Belgium and
other continental European countries); Andre Lucas et al., France, in 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra, at FRA-1 23 (distinguishing fair use in the
United States from French exceptions to copyright); see also Loi relative au droit
d'auteur et aux droits voisins [Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of 1994],
June 30, 1994, Moniteur belge/Belgisch Staatsblad 27/07/1994, arts. 22-23 (Belg.);
Law No. 2006-961 of Aug. 1, 2006, art. L 122-25, Journal Officiel de la R6publique
Franaise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 3, 2006, p. 11,529 (French Intellec-
tual Property Code); Geset Tiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte
(Urheberrechtsgesetz) [German Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights] Sept. 9,
1965, as amended 1998, BGBI. I, arts. 48-53; MICHAEL SPENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY 114 (2007) (distinguishing fair use in the United States from fair dealing in the
United Kingdom); Paul Ganley, Google Book Search: Fair Use, Fair Dealing and the
Case for Intermediary Copying 7-21 Uan. 13, 2006) (unpublished working paper)
(contrasting fair use and fair dealing), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=875384.
172 Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter ECD].
173 Id. art. 10, at 12.
174 Id. pmbl., at 1.
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engaging in the transient storage or reproduction of the information
for transmission, shall not give rise to monetary liability irrespective of
notice of illegal activity. 175 Injunctive relief to curtail infringement
remains available. 176 Similarly, transmitting information provided by
users on a temporary and automatic basis shall not create monetary
liability if
[the ISP] acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the
information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the
fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has
been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled,
or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such
removal or disablement. 177
Similarly, an ISP will not be held liable for storing information submit-
ted by a user as long as
[the provider] does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is
apparent; or... upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. 178
The ECD also provides that: "Member States shall not impose a
general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered
by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they trans-
mit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circum-
stances indicating illegal activity." 179 It does not preclude injunctive
or administrative relief aimed at preventing or terminating infringe-
ment, while stressing that any order or action terminating "the
removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance
of the principle of freedom of expression.' 8 0
The ECD's emphasis upon "actual knowledge of illegal activity"
was consistent with the existing jurisprudence of E.U. member states
on the liability of intermediaries such as book publishers or ISPs for
the actions of their authors or users. For example, in 1992, the Ger-
man Supreme Court held that an intermediary has an interest in free-
dom of expression that overrides the interest of plaintiffs in holding
publishers liable for information they may be presumed to "know"
about because they published it. The case involved liability for
175 See id. art. 12, at 12.
176 See id. at 13.
177 Id. art. 13, at 13.
178 Id. art. 14, at 13.
179 Id. art. 15, at 13.
180 Id. pmbl., at 6.
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infringing advertisements under the Act on Unfair Competition, 18'
but its reasoning applies with equal force to the copyright context.
I82
Similarly, the German Multimedia Act of 1997183 provided that online
intermediaries are only liable for third party content on their sites "if
they have actual knowledge of the content and if the prevention of
further dissemination is technically possible and can reasonably be
expected of them."' 8 4 Finally, the Swedish Act on Responsibility for
Electronic Bulletin Boards of 1998185 prohibited holding network
providers liable for copyright infringement, and made other ISPs lia-
ble only for "obviously" infringing content that they could reasonably
be expected to find given the size of their service.
186
Similar rules applied in online defamation cases prior to the
ECD. The United Kingdom's Defamation Act of 1996187 allowed
online intermediaries to enjoy the benefit of the "'innocent dissemi-
nation' defense for distributors" of hard copies, if the intermediary
could show that it exercised reasonable care in its operations and had
no knowledge or reason to know that it was facilitating the dissemina-
tion of defamatory material. 188 Given that defamation can inflict even
worse damage to an individual's psyche and earning power than copy-
right infringement, it would be inequitable not to apply similar rules.
B. The European Convention on Human Rights: Establishing Extra-
Statutory Exemptions from Copyright to Safeguard Freedom
of Expression
Article 10 of the ECHR has been construed to create an excep-
tion to copyright needed to protect freedom of expression. 189 Some
181 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Act Against Unfair Competition],
June 7, 1909, RGBI. at 499, last amended July 3, 2004, BGBI. I at 1414, § 1 (F.R.G.).
182 See Kamiel J. Koelman, Online Intermediary Liability, in COPYRIGHT AND ELEC-
TRONIC COMMERCE 7, 41 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 2000) (citing Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 26, 1990, Gwerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht [GRUR] 1012 (F.R.G.) (Pressehaflung 1); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] May 7, 1992, Gwerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
[GRUR] 618 (F.R.G.) (PressehafiungI1)).
183 Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz (IuKDG) [Information and
Communication Services (Multimedia) Act], Aug. 1, 1997, BGBI. I at 1120 (F.R.G.).
184 Koelman, supra note 182, at 26.
185 Lag om ansvar f6r elektroniska anslagstavlor (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS]
1998:112) (Swed.).
186 Koelman, supra note 182, at 25.
187 Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31.
188 Koelman, supra note 182, at 24.
189 P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 343, 354-58 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al.
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of the highest courts in the member states of the European Union
have confirmed this interpretation or construction. 190 Case law in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom mandates exceptions to
copyright where necessary to safeguard freedom of expression and
the public interest in access to information. 19 1 The legal principles
recognized and expounded upon by the courts in these cases are cer-
tain to be taken up and extended to resolve disputes regarding efforts
by copyright holders to silence Internet criticism or commentary
upon their works or practices.
The following represents a brief canvass of these authorities,
based on the research of Professor Bernt Hugenholtz, Director of the
Institute for Information Law at the University of Amsterdam.
In 1962, the Berlin District Court ruled that freedom of expres-
sion, protected by Article 5 of the German Basic Law,192 supplied an
"extra-statutory justification" that could be asserted by a defendant
accused of rebroadcasting a news report on television without
authorization. 193
In 1968, the Berlin Court of Appeal allowed the unconsented
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted cartoons in a "critical
analysis" of press reports. 194
In 1985, the German Supreme Court endorsed the approaches of
the Berlin District Court and the Berlin Court of Appeals by stating
eds., 2001); see also ECD, supra note 172, pmbl. at 2 (recognizing the importance of
copyright law respecting the ECHR).
190 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic Viewv, in Copy-
RIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37, 55-61 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004).
191 See id. at 57-60; Hugenholtz, supra note 189, at 354-58; Lucas et al., supra note
171, at FRA-123 n.56 (citing Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Toulouse, Sept. 26, 2001, Legipresse 2001, I, 149, which holds
that "Article 10 of the Convention of Human Rights [E.C.H.R.] ... legitimizes the full
reproduction of a previously published paper"). But cf id. (citing Paris, 4e ch. A, Dec.
12, 2001, Juris-Data No. 161701, which holds that "freedom of the press need not
override intellectual property rights").
192 Grundgesetz ffur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23,
1949, art. 5.
193 Hugenholtz, supra note 189, at 355 (citing Landgericht [LG] [trial court] Dec.
12, 1960, [1962] Gwerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 207 (F.R.G.)
(Maifeiorn)).
194 Id. (citing Kammergericht [KG] [Court of Appeal] Nov. 26, 1968, [1969] 54
Archiv ffir Urheber- Film-Funk-und Theaterrecht [UFITA] 296 (F.R.G.) (Bild
Zeitung)).
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that an "unusually urgent information need" may create "limits to cop-
yright exceeding the express statutory limitations."' 95
In 1994, the District Court of Amsterdam stated that the freedom
of expression and information assured by Article 10 of the ECHR may
warrant creating an additional exception to copyright for reproduc-
tions and distributions of material that are necessary to engage in
news reporting.19 6
In 1995 the Dutch Supreme Court announced a ruling that
added a balancing-of-interests defense to trademark lawsuits despite
the fact that no statutory exception to trademark rights applied under
the facts of the case, which involved gray market goods.197 The court
"confirmed that, in principle, trademarks and copyrights may conflict
with Article 10 ECHR."' 98
In 1999, a Paris trial court rejected a copyright claim based on the
reproduction and display of twelve copyrighted paintings on the
national television network France 2 on the grounds that Article 10
preempted national law to the extent that it restricted television net-
works from educating the public about "important cultural events." 199
Professor Hugenholtz summarizes these decisions with the con-
clusion: "Recent court decisions from Europe seem to suggest that
freedom of expression and information, as guaranteed inter alia in
the [ECHR], may under specific circumstances limit overbroad [copy-
right] protection."20 0
Since 2000, some of the highest courts in the European Union
have again taken up this theme. As Michael Birnhack, the former co-
director of the Haifa Center of Law & Technology has pointed out,
the German Federal Constitutional Court has held that the freedom
of expression and of artistic license guaranteed by Article 5 of the
195 Id. at 356 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 7,
1985, [1987] Gwerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 34 (Lili
Marleen)).
196 See id. at 356-57 (citing Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb.], Amsterdam [ordi-
nary court of first instance and court of appeal to the Kantongerecht], 19 January
1994, [1994] Informatierechst/Ami 51 (Boogschutter)).
197 Id. at 353 (citing Dior/Evora, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme
Court of the Netherlands], 20 oktober 1995, NJ 682 (Dior/Evora)).
198 Id. at 357 (discussing the Dutch Supreme Court confirmation that, in princi-
ple, copyrights and trademarks may conflict with Article 10 of the ECHR (citing Dior/
Evora, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 20
oktober 1995, NJ 682 (Dior/Evora))).
199 Id. at 357-58 (citing Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of
originaljurisdiction] Paris, Feb. 23, 1999, 184 Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur
374 (2000) (Utrillo v. France 2)).
200 Id. at 343.
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Basic Law trumps the otherwise valid right of a copyright holder to
restrain the critical transformation of a script for another author's
play into a new script.2 0 1 Similarly, several French professors have also
noted that case law now exists in France for the recognition of a non-
statutory free speech exception to copyright in France. 20 2 And the
Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom has held that there is a place,
beyond the express limitations contained in the U.K. Copyright Act,
for "accommodat[ing] the right of freedom of expression" when it
comes into conflict with copyright protections to which none of the
express exceptions in the Act apply.20 3 A British professor has charac-
terized the fair dealing exception in the United Kingdom as protect-
ing "short extracts and long comments "204 in order to safeguard
"expressive autonomy" and the "public interest."20 5
Some more recent decisions of courts within the European
Union have declined to recognize an extrastatutory defense to claims
of copyright infringement in the interest of freedom of expression or
access to information. 20 6 According to Professors Alain Strowel and
Fran~ois Tulkens, in their survey of cases decided in Europe in 2003
and 2004 as well as Professor Lessig's ideas about the intersection
between IP and freedom of expression, civil law IP lawyers may not be
taking freedom of expression very seriously, leading to a potential
"backlash" against intellectual property.2 0 7 The backlash may come,
they believe, because courts in Belgium, France, and Germany, in par-
ticular, are not always careful about recognizing the public interest in
access to culture. 20 8
201 See Birnhack, supra note 190, at 57 n.104 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] June 29, 2000, BVerfGE 825/98 (Germania
3)).
202 See Lucas et al., supra note 171, at FRA-123 n. 56 (citing conflicting cases on
this point, but in support of it, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court
of original jurisdiction] Toulouse, Sept. 26, 2001, Legipresse 2001,1, 149, as "holding
that Article 10 of the Convention of Human Rights [E.C.H.R.] legitimizes the full
reproduction of a previously published paper").
203 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2002] Q.B. 5, 45 (Court of Appeal);
Birnhack, supra note 189, at 60.
204 SPENCE, supra note 171, at 115 (quoting Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84,
94).
205 Id.
206 Alain Strowel & Frangois Tulkens, Freedom of Expression and Copyright Under Civil
Law: Of Balance, Adaptation, and Access, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 287, 296-310
(Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005).
207 Id. at 312-13 (citing LESSIG, supra note 54, at 225-27).
208 See id. at 298-313.
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C. Applying the ECD and the European Convention on Human Rights:
Crafting an Opt-Out Copyright System for the Internet in the
European Union
Courts within the European Union have applied these principles
from the ECD and the ECHR to reach conclusions similar to those
arrived at by U.S. courts. Courts in several E.U. countries have ruled
that distributors of technologies that may be used to infringe copy-
rights are not liable for their customers' infringement absent "actual
knowledge of a specific infringement at the time when the supplier
could take action to prevent it."209
Courts in the Netherlands have issued rulings in this area that
have attracted interest not simply in Europe, but in the United States
as well. 210 In 1996, the President of the District Court in the Hague
held that "a hosting service provider does not directly infringe copy-
rights and may only be held liable if he knows or has a reason to know
of the actual wrongful act taking place over its installations. '" 21 1 The
court explained that
[ISPs] do nothing more than to give the opportunity [for] publica-
tion and.., in principle, they can exert no influence over, nor have
knowledge of, what the person who gain[s] access to Internet
through them, will supply.
In principle, therefore, there is no reason to hold them respon-
sible for wrongful acts of users, e.g. copyright infringements by third
parties.
A responsibility might be assumed in a situation where it is
unequivocally clear that a publication of a user is wrongful and
where it can be assumed with reason that such is known to the
access provider, for instance because someone has notified the pro-
vider of this. In such cases, Internet access providers might be
requested to take steps against the user in question.
2 12
209 Brief Amici Curiae of 40 Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors
Supporting Affirmance at 3 n.3, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894 and 03-55901), 2003 WL 22753810.
210 See Morgan, supra note 77; ISPs Are Not 'Publishers' and Cannot Be Held Lia-
ble for User's Copyright Infringement, Pike & Fischer Internet Law & Regulation,
Sept. 17, 2003, http://internetlaw.pf.com; Dinant T.L. Oosterbaan, Intellectual Property
and the Internet: A Dutch Perspective, 2 E-CoM. L. REP. 21 (2003).
211 Koelman, supra note 182, at 20 (citing Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb
B.V., Arrondissementrechtbank [Rb.] [ordinary court of first instance and court of
appeal to the Kantongerecht], Hague, 12 maart 1996, http://wwxv.spaink.net/cos/
verdleng.html (Neth.) (Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb B. V.)).
212 Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb B.V., Arrondissementrechtbank [Rb.]
[ordinary court of first instance and court of appeal to the Kantongerecht], Hague,
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The Hague court sitting in full procedure (Bodemprocedure)
agreed with the President of the District Court, stating as follows:
The court first notes that the activities of the Service Providers with
regard to this case are limited to providing information from and/
or to its users and the storage of this information. The Service Prov-
iders do not select the information and do not process it either....
[I]n these circumstances the Service Providers do not do the pub-
lishing themselves, but only provide the opportunity for
publication.
The court further believes that the activities of the Service Prov-
iders do not involve a copyright relevant reproduction. . . . The
court finds support for this position in that stipulated in art. 5 para-
graph 1 of the amended proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and Council on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society, submitted
by the Commission of the European Communities on 21 May
1999 ....
This does not detract from the fact that the Service Provider,
who does not reproduce or publish material himself, nevertheless
can be bound to assist and take adequate measures, on the grounds
of the care that is fitting in the conduct of society, if he is notified
that one of the users of his computer system is infringing copyright
or otherwise acting unlawfully through the use of his home
page .... 213
The article of the Copyright Directive referred to by the court
exempts network transmissions and related reproductions such as
temporary caching.214 Only after noting its resolution of the case in
favor of the defendants did the court find no violation of the "right of
the freedom of expression, as laid down in art. 10 of the
[Convention]. "215
12 maart 1996, http://www.spaink.net/cos/verdleng.html (Neth.) (Church of Spiri-
tual Tech./Dataweb B. V.).
213 Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb BY., Arrondissementrechtbank [Rb.]
[ordinary court of first instance and court of appeal to the Kantongerecht], Hague, 9
juini 1999, http://www.spaink.net/cos/verd2eng.html (Neth.) (Church of Spiritual
Tech./Dataweb B. V.).
214 Copyright Directive, supra note 41, art. 5(1); see also MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, Corv-
RIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 258 (2004) (explaining that the Copy-
right Directive "exempts temporary acts of reproduction, such as caching, for the
purpose of enabling network transmissions and lawful uses").
215 Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb B.V., Arrondissementrechtbank [Rb.]
[ordinary court of first instance and court of appeal to the Kantongerecht], Hague, 9
juini 1999, http://www.spaink.net/cos/verd2eng.html (Neth.) (Church of Spiritual
Tech./Dataweb B. V.).
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With respect to direct infringement by the Internet user who
posts copyrighted material herself, the Dutch courts arrived at strik-
ingly similar conclusions. Even assuming that the user posted infring-
ing extracts of documents to the Internet, the "full procedure" court
refused to award any relief to the copyright owner because after
receiving notice of the owner's infringement claim, the user removed
the documents, basically mooting the owner's claim "with no fear of a
repetition. '" 2 16
In 2003, the Court of Appeal for the Hague affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower courts, emphasizing the severe threat to freedom of
expression posed by the prospect of ISP liability for users' copyright
violations. 217 The court declared at the outset that Article 10 of the
ECHR guarantees "the right of freedom of information," and that
"[i] n particular cases it is conceivable that assertion of the copyright,
such as a ban on infringement, must yield to the freedom of informa-
tion."218 Any limitation on the freedom of information must be "nec-
essary in a democratic society," meaning that it has to be directed at a
"'pressing social need'" and be "'proportionate'" to that aim. 219 The
court then held that the Internet user's quotations from Scientology's
copyrighted works were lawful because she intended them to provide
information on "the Scientology doctrine and the procedure in the
Scientology organisation." 220 The court concluded that the evidence
supported a finding that the plaintiffs' objective in preventing their
copyrighted works from being quoted on the Internet was "to exercise
216 Id. The President of the District Court of the Hague had reached a similar
conclusion, stating:
It is also a matter of fact that defendant, when the plaintiffs-after thereto
pressed by the defendants-had given a better basis for their copyright
claims, has modified her homepage drastically.
That she now violates the copyright of any of the plaintiffs has not been
made plausible. Insofar as she still is quoting literally from protected works,
these passages are nothing more than quotes that, considering the context
in which they are being used, fall under the exempt ruling of art. 15A of the
Copyright Law.
Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb B.V., Arrondissementrechtbank [Rb.] [ordinary
court of first instance and court of appeal to the Kantongerecht], Hague, 12 maart
1996, http://www.spaink.net/cos/verdleng.html (Neth.) (Church of Spiritual Tech./
Dataweb B. V.).
217 Church of Spiritual Tech./Dataweb B.V., Gerechtshof [Hof] [ordinary court of
appeal], Hague, 4 september 2003, [2004] E.C.D.R. 25, § 8.4 (Neth.).
218 Id. § 8.2.
219 Id. (quoting The Sunday Times Case v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 35-36 (1979).
220 Id. § 8.4.
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power over Scientology members and to prevent discussions about
Scientology's doctrine and practices."22 1
The Court of Appeals' decision was even more significant on the
issue of ISP liability. The court rejected the idea of this overextension
of copyright liability outright, and without regard to an ISP's actual or
constructive knowledge of infringement:
In the Court's opinion, service providers only provide the tech-
nical facilities for others to expose information. Therefore it does
not seem right to consider them as being equivalent to publishers,
who themselves publish. This view is in accordance with the Agreed
Statement with Art. 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty:
"It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities
for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount
to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne
Convention."
Since the quotations Spaink used did not infringe the copy-
right, there can not be any infringement of copyright by the provid-
ers either.2 22
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands adopted similar princi-
ples for the resolution of the case involving a principal heir to Nap-
ster's user base, Kazaa.2 23 The court found no liability, employing an
analysis very similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony and the
lower courts' decisions applying it in Grokster.22 4 As the Associated
Press reported, the music industry wanted the Dutch Supreme Court
to rule that Kazaa should be held liable for copyright infringement for
failing to police its system for-and filter out-copyrighted works. 225
The court refused, endorsing a 2002 decision by an appeals court that
no liability to the copyright owners could be imposed on Kazaa. 226
The appeals court had reversed the decision of the President of the
District Court of Amsterdam that forced Kazaa to shut down its web-
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See Associated Press, Dutch Court Throws Out Kazaa Case, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 19,
2003, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2003/12/61672 [hereinaf-
ter Dutch Court].
224 Eiseressen/Kazaa B.V., Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of
the Netherlands], 19 december 2003, 4.9, 5.36-5.39, http://zoeken.rechtspraak.
nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=AN7253&u-ljn=AN7253
(Kazaa B.V.).
225 See Dutch Court, supra note 223.
226 Id.
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based file-sharing software. 2 27 The court of appeals had reached a
conclusion very similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony:
Kazaajustly contests the president's consideration that.., by giving
its users the opportunity of downloading music files by means of its
computer program without a license, Kazaa acts contrary to copy-
right. Insofar as there are acts that are relevant to copyright such
acts are performed by those who use the computer program and
not by Kazaa. Providing the means for publication or reproduction
of copyrighted works is not an act of publication or reproduction in
its own right. Also, it is not true, that is for the moment it cannot be
assumed to be true, that the Kazaa computer program is exclusively
used for downloading copyrighted works. In its appeal, Kazaa
presented a large number of examples (exhibits 17 and 18) of
works that were distributed by means of Kazaa either with the
author's permission or that are part of the public domain, or that
are not copyrighted or of which the distribution is permitted under
a legal limitation to copyright. 228
The Dutch Supreme Court cited the Sony case and the district
court decision in Grokster (the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet issued
its decision) in support of its judgment. 229
In Germany, a district court for Hamburg rejected a claim
brought by a major scientific publisher against Google for its Google
Book Search functionality. Google has reached agreements with
many libraries and library systems in the United States, Europe, and
elsewhere to scan millions of public domain and copyrighted books,
and to make them searchable and capable of being read in full or
previewed in short fragments, depending on the copyright status of
the particular book. 230 Unsatisfied with Google's efforts to limit read-
ing of copyrighted books to a few lines around each search term, the
German publisher sought an injunction against Google, with the sup-
port of a German publishing trade association. The German court
rejected the request, noting that Google removed book previews after
227 Buma & Stemra/Kazaa B.V., Gerechtshof [Hof] [ordinary court of appeal],
Amsterdam, 28 maart 2002, 4.7, 5, http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/BUMA v Kazaa/20
020328_kazaa..appeal-judgment.html (Neth.) (Buma & Stemra/Kazaa B. V).
228 Id. 4.9; see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
229 Eiseressen/Kazaa B.V., Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of
the Netherlands], 19 december 2003, 5.36-5.39 http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/
resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&lj=AN7253&u-ljn=AN7253
(Kazaa B.V).
230 George Pike, Legal Update 2007: Where the Lawsuits Are, INFO. TODAY, Nov. 2007,
at 1; The Google Six: UC System Joins Google's Scan Plan, LIBR. J. ACADEMIC NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.libraryjournal.com/info/CA6361500.html.
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receiving copyright complaints, and that in any event it only made
available very small and fragmentary previews of particular pages. 231
In the United Kingdom, one of the most notable opinions deals
with defamation rather than intellectual property. In addressing defa-
mation claims against several ISPs including AOL, British Telecom
(BT), and Tiscali, the court found that the ISPs were entitled to
defenses under the regulations implementing the ECD in Britain.
The court declared:
When considering the internet, it is so often necessary to resort to
analogies which, in the nature of things, are unlikely to be com-
plete. That is because the internet is a new phenomenon. Never-
theless, an analogy has been drawn in this case with the postal
services. That is to say, ISPs do not participate in the process of
publication as such, but merely act as facilitators in a similar way to
the postal services. They provide a means of transmitting communi-
cations without in any way participating in that process.
"There is ... a line of authority arising out of intellectual prop-
erty cases in the United Kingdom to the effect that persons who
procure the commission of torts are liable jointly and severally
with the principle tortfeasor, while persons who merely facilitate
the commission of such torts are not exposed to liability. It is
possible that this line of authority might apply to defamation
law. If so, telephone carriers might be mere facilitators of
defamatory telephone calls, and so not capable of being held
liable as publishers."
I turn first to the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002, which came into force in August of that year.
They define the circumstances in which internet intermediaries
should be held accountable for material which is hosted, cached, or
carried by them but which they did not create. The protection
which these regulations afford is not confined to the publication of
defamatory material. They embrace other illegal material, such as
child pornography or the infringement of intellectual property
rights.23
2
231 See Werner Von Hendrik, Schnipseljagd Das umstrittene Digitalisierungs-Projekt
Google Print erringt vor Gericht einen Teilerfolg, DIE WELT, June 2006, http://www.welt.
de/print-welt/article226266/Schnipseljagd.html.
232 Bunt v. Tilley, [2006] EWHC (QB) 407, 9-10, 38, 2003 All E.R. 336 (QB)
(quoting MATHEW COLLINS, THE LAw OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 199, 201 (2d
ed. 2005)).
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The court acknowledged that ISP liability might exist under the ECD,
but not under the particular facts alleged, which involved insufficient
"awareness" or "editorial responsibility. ' 23 3
In France, courts have applied Article 6 of the Law for Confi-
dence in the Digital Economy 23 4 to restrict the liability of online
intermediaries to cases of "actual knowledge," "obviously illicit" con-
tent, or failure to promptly take down information upon receiving
complaints. 235 A Paris court held in 2006 in a case involving alleged
privacy violations by a blog hosted on Google France, that
under the terms of article 6 of the law of June 21, 2004 on confi-
dence in the digital economy, the host is not responsible for the
contents of the site it only hosts; [but] it is held to withdraw the
stored data or to make their access impossible as from the moment
233 See id. 22, 39-74.
234 Law No. 2004-575 ofJune 21, 2004,Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 22, 2004, Art. 22, Law for Confidence in the
Digital Economy, p. 11,168, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.
do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000801164&dateTexte=.
235 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 9, 2007, http://www.
juriscom.net/documents/caparis2007llO9.pdf (eBay) (requiring actual knowledge of
illegality and failure to promptly withdraw the information upon notification of ille-
gality) (translation byJuriscom.net with my alterations); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Versailles, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.juriscom.net/documents/
caversailles20071212.pdf (Arnaques.com) (requiring actual knowledge of illegality or
its obviousness under the circumstances or a failure to promptly take the information
down upon receipt of complaints about it) (translation byjuriscom.net with my alter-
ations); Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgiparis20071029.pdf
(Wikinedia Foundation Inc.) (requiring "actual knowledge" or clearly apparent illegal-
ity) (translation by Juriscom.net with my alterations); Tribunal de grande instance
[T.G.I.] [ordinary court of jurisdiction] Paris, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.juriscom.
net/documents/tgiaris2006lOl9.pdf (Google France SA) (requiring actual knowledge
of illegality or "obviously illicit" content) (translation byJuriscom.net with my altera-
tions); Marc Zaffagni, Wikipedia Reinforced by Justice, CNET FRANCE, Nov. 5, 2007,
http://www.cnetfrance.fr/news/internet/wikipedia-conforte-par-la-justice-39375110.
htm. The law cited in these cases is Law No. 2004-575 of June 21, 2004, Journal
Officiel de ]a R~publique Franaise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], June 22, 2004,
Art. 22, Law for Confidence in the Digital Economy, p. 11,168, available at http://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000801164&date
Texte=. In 2007, the court of first instance of Brussels issued a somewhat more restric-
tive opinion from the perspective of intermediaries, requiring them to filter out
infringing material after receiving warning, but imposing no "general obligation to
monitor the network" as per the ECD. Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles
[court of first instance] Brussels, June 29, 2007, No. 04/8975/A (BeIg.) (La Socilti
Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) v. Tiscali).
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when it is informed of their obviously illicit nature or if a decision of
court orders that. 23 6
Similarly, in a case involving alleged defamation and invasion of
privacy by Wikipedia, another Paris court held that an ISP is not liable
for information it hosts in the absence of "actual knowledge" of its
illegality.2 37 The court declared that under section 6-1.2 of the Act for
Confidence in the Digital Economy, hosting providers have no "gen-
eral obligation to monitor the information stored, or to search for
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity." 238 In November
2007 the Court of Appeal for Paris held that eBay Europe and eBay
France, acting as intermediaries for online auctions, are entitled
under "article 6-1.2 of the law of the 21 [June] 2004 for confidence in
the digital economy," to offer facilities for the storage of
"messages . . . provided by recipients of [their] services" without
thereby incurring
civil liability because of the stored activities or information at the
request for a recipient for these services if [eBay Europe and eBay
France lacked] knowledge of their illicit nature or facts and circum-
stances revealing this character or if, as of the moment when they
were informed of it, they acted promptly to withdraw these data or
to make access to them impossible. 239
Finally, in a December 2007 case involving Arnaques.com, the
Court of Appeal for Versailles ruled that under article 6-1.2 of the Act
for Confidence in the Digital Economy ISPs could not incur civil lia-
bility because of information stored at the request of a user of these
services if they did not have knowledge of the illegality or "facts and
circumstances revealing this character, or if, as of the moment when
they were informed of it, they acted promptly to withdraw these data
or to make [access to them] impossible," and that an ISP is entitled to
236 Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of jurisdiction] Paris,
Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgiaris20061019.pdf (Google
France SA) (requiring actual knowledge of illegality or "obviously illicit" content)
(translation byJuriscom.net with my alterations).
237 See Zaffagni, supra note 235.
238 Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgiparis20071029.pdf
( Wikimedia Foundation Inc.) (translation by Juriscom.net with my alterations). Some
language in the court's opinion could be construed as suggesting that liability might
exist if the illegality was clearly apparent. Id.
239 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 9, 2007, http://www.
juriscom.net/documents/caparis2007l109.pdf (eBay) (translation by Juriscom.net
with my alterations).
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"precision as for the facts complained of and their site [i.e.
location] .240
The French counterpart to the U.S. doctrine of fair use also pro-
vides a defense to computer-based and online services for their role in
aggregating information. In 1985, the French Cour de Cassation held
that the inclusion and categorization of excerpts of copyrighted news-
paper articles in a computer database fell within the exemption for
informative "analyses and brief quotations" because the "bringing
together and classifying" of the excerpts was analogous to other forms
of commentary on a work.241 Along with Article 6 of the Act on Confi-
dence in the Digital Economy, the "analyses and brief quotations"
exception should help undergird Google's defense of cases in France
against its Google Book Search and Google Video information
services. 2
42
These cases, taken together, could be understood as establishing
a framework for resolving copyright cases against Internet companies
that is not too far removed from the framework that is evolving in the
United States. First, Article 15 of the ECD, as construed by the French
and Belgian tribunals, makes clear that ISPs have no obligation to
actively monitor their services and proactively seek out infringe-
ments. 243 Second, the Dutch Supreme Court has made clear that
Sony, which focuses on the knowledge of the ISP of infringement and
its intention to permit it-and not the fact that its service is capable of
facilitating infringement-provides an appropriate set of principles
for resolving similar cases within the European Union.244 Third, the
240 Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, Dec. 12, 2007, http://
www.juriscom.net/documents/caversailles200 71212.pdf (Arnaques.com) (translation
byJuriscom.net with my alterations).
241 Lucas et al., supra note 171, at FRA-127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The exemption referred to is Article L. 122-5(3) (a) of the French Intellectual Prop-
erty Code. See id. at FRA-126.
242 See, e.g., Digital Markets, http://blogs.zdnet.com/micro-markets/ (Nov. 23,
2006, 10:47); Flach Film assigne Google pour contrefafon et parasitisme, LE MONDE INFORMA-
TIQUE, Nov. 24, 2006, http://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-flach-film-
assigne-google-pour-contrefacon-et-parasitisme-21453.html; French Book Publisher Sues
Google, BBC NEWS, June 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/
5052912.stm; Keith Regan, Google Sued in France Over Video, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Nov.
27, 2006), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/54434.html.
243 ECD, supra note 172, art. 15, at 13; Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordi-
nary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.juriscom.net/doc-
uments/tgiparis20071029.pdf (Wikimedia Foundation Inc.); Tribunal de premiere
Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels,June 29, 2007, No. 04/8975/A
(Belg.) (La Socigtg Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) v. Tiscali).
244 See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text. Although Sony's discussion of
vicarious liability for infringement (as opposed to contributory liability) did not
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Dutch courts in the Scientology and Kazaa matters properly distin-
guished between an Internet user's acts of publishing material to
other users, and an Internet company's role in facilitating or enhanc-
ing the reach of such publication, which should give rise to copyright
liability, if at all, only upon disregard of an unambiguous user
infringement. Finally, the French and Dutch courts have clarified that
Internet users or companies maintaining databases have a right to
quote from or categorize copyrighted works in their own right without
incurring liability, just as the U.S. court in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.
deemed the indexing and display of information by an Internet com-
pany to be a fair use because it improves access to the information,
particularly where the company respects clear opt-outs from its index
so as to manifest an intention to comply with the law.2 4 5 This also
parallels the conclusions of the recent federal decisions in the United
States on the potential liability of Google for providing its storage and
search engine features.2 46
On the other hand, there is a line of cases in the European
Union that could be read to reject the framework established in the
Scientology, Kazaa, and the French database and Wikipedia cases. These
cases range from the Google News case in Belgium (also known as the
Copiepresse case) to the MySpace and DailyMotion cases in France, and
the Paperboy case in Germany. They establish what could become an
alternative framework for resolving Internet copyright disputes. It
would hold intermediaries such as MySpace or YouTube liable for
always make knowledge or purpose to infringe a requirement, the Court articulated a
standard based on knowledge and intent. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17, 439 (1984).
245 See supra notes 217, 241 and accompanying text; see also Tribunal de premiere
Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels, June 29, 2007, No. 04/8975/A
(Belg.) (La Socigtg Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) v. Tiscali); Tribu-
nal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Oct. 29,
2007, http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tgiparis20071029.pdf ( Wikimedia Founda-
tion Inc.). The French court in Wikimedia Foundation cited Article 6-4-7 of the Law
for Confidence in the Digital Economy, which states in French that ISPs are not
under "une obligation grnrrale de surveiller les informations qu'elles transmettent
ou stockent, ni a une obligation grnrrale de rechercher des faits ou des circonstances
r6vrlant des activit6s illicites." That translates roughly, in English, to say that ISPs "are
under no general obligation to monitor the information which they transmit or store,
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating unlawful
activity." The Belgian court in Tiscali cited Article 15 of the ECD, which uses nearly
the same language the French Law for Confidence in the Digital Economy.
246 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2007) (image
search); Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App'x 833, 836-37 (3d Cir. 2007) (storage and
Web search); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119-21 (D. Nev. 2006)
(Web search).
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facilitating and deriving a benefit from user uploads of infringing
content.247
First, this framework would be less careful than the Dutch courts
have been about not holding an online intermediary liable absent
knowledge of specific illegal activity. The Paris Court of First Instance
did this in two recent cases in which it acknowledged the absence of
any duty by ISPs to monitor their services for illegal activity, but never-
theless held MySpace and DailyMotion (which is like YouTube) liable
for facilitating and deriving a benefit from user uploads of infringing
content.248  Similarly, in 2007 the Brussels Court of First Instance
issued a somewhat less careful opinion from the perspective of
intermediaries. It declared that while ISPs are under no "general obli-
gation to monitor the network" under the ECD, and do not constitute
the publisher or editor of content they transmit or store, they may
nevertheless be obliged to employ technical measures to block or fil-
ter out infringing information.249
Second, this framework would regard Article 10(2) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights as compatible with extensive cen-
sorship of the Internet on copyright grounds, as a measure that is
necessary to protect the "rights of others."250 A prior Belgian case,
Index v. Biblio, provides a precedent for this conclusion, even though
the Copiepresse decision did not cite that case while arriving at a similar
conclusion. In the Biblio case, the Belgium Supreme Court (Court of
Cassation) found that the publisher of tax journals was entitled to an
injunction against the maker of a database summarizing tax judg-
ments and other materials from the plaintiffs' journals.251 It rejected
247 Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels,
Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (BeIg.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.); Tribunal de
grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court ofjurisdiction] Paris, Ordonnance de r~f~r6,
June 22, 2007, http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id-article=1965
(MySpace); Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court ofjurisdiction] Paris,
3e ch., 2e sec., July 13, 2007, http://wv.legalis.net/breves-article.php3?id-article=
1977 (DailyMotion); Strowel & Tulkens, supra note 206, at 308-09 (discussing
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 17, 2003, 47 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 2003 (3406) (F.R.G.)
(Paperoy)); Alain Strowel, Google et les Nouveaux Services en Ligne: Quels Effets sur
l'Economie des Contenus, Quels Defispour la Propridtg Intellectuelle, JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX, Sept. 22, 2007, at 589-98 (discussing Copiepresse and DailyMotion cases).
248 See Strowel, supra note 247.
249 See Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brus-
sels, June 29, 2007, No. 04/8975/A (Belg.) (La SociitBelge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et
Editeurs (SABAM) v. Tiscali).
250 See Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brus-
sels, Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (Belg.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.).
251 See Strowel & Tulkens, supra note 206, at 305.
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the idea that copyright restricted freedom of expression within the
meaning of Article 10 of the ECHR.25 2 Similarly, in France, a case
that seems relevant to the MySpace and DailyMotion cases is Utrillo v.
France 2, where the French Supreme Court rejected a Paris court's
ruling that Article 10 gave a television news broadcaster the right to
display twelve copyrighted paintings in a story on an art exhibition. 253
Third, the alternative framework would confine copyright excep-
tions-such as citations in a review of published work-as restrictively
as possible. At least one court has opined that such a construction of
copyright exceptions facilitates compliance with the Copyright Direc-
tive. 254 For example, this framework would regard categorizing web-
sites for searching purposes as a disfavored exception to copyright,
compared to traditional exceptions like that for reviews of a book in
the print press. As the Copiepresse decision stated, Google was not enti-
tled to an exception to copyright because it "limits itself to listing the
articles and classing them and this in an automatic way," and "does
not carry out any analysis, comparison or critique of these articles
which are not commented on in any way."'255 Google or other online
services would be denied the benefit of copyright exceptions for the
reproduction of short fragments of works for purposes of news report-
ing; they would be required to get licenses because they are long-term
enterprises. 256 Print newspapers, however, could not be expected to
seek licenses because of their publication deadlines. 257 An analogous
ruling by a district court in the United States denied XM Satellite
Radio the benefit of its users' right to make fair use of songs played
over the radio by recording them for later listening, in disregard not
only of Sony but also of the language of the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992.258
252 See Tribunal de premire Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brus-
sels, Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (Beig.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.).
253 See Strowel & Tulkens, supra note 206, at 306-07 (citing Tribunal de grande
instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Feb. 23, 1999, 184
Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur 374 (2000) (Utrillo v. France 2)).
254 Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels,
Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (Belg.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.) (citing Copy-




258 See At. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1407, 1413 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (confining Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1008 (2006), as well as Sony and fair use defenses, as narrowly as possible by
declaring that "'for profit users [may not] stand in the shoes of their customers mak-
ing nonprofit or noncommercial uses,'" based on "the fundamental tenet of copy-
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Fourth, the alternative framework would disregard well-under-
stood Internet standards for preventing the indexing or caching of
websites, namely <meta> tags or robots.txt, 259 because "copyright is
not a right of opposition but a right for prior authorisation. 260 These
standards are vital for the functioning of the Internet, because they
establish an opt-out system for indexing websites and making them
searchable without imposing an impossibly expensive requirement of
prior authorization. 26 1
Fifth, it would adopt an expansive view of moral rights whereby
any indexing or quotation from works is an illegal "amputation" and
any author has the right to prevent any "modification" of her work
even for the purpose of providing more information about it. Fur-
ther, these moral rights do not require any damage to the author at all
to be invoked.262
Finally, it would impose monetary damages out of proportion to
actual losses inflicted by the defendant. For example, Google News
was charged 25,000 Euros for each day plaintiffs material was on the
site. 26 3
As should be clear from merely describing this alternative frame-
work, it is a recipe for outlawing the Internet in the European Union,
at least outside of the Netherlands. Litigation of the type instituted by
the Belgian newspapers, should it be imitated by other entities desir-
ing to obtain damages from Google or other Internet companies for
incidental copying of their works in the course of indexing the Web,
could result in nearly unlimited copyright liability and a substantial
disincentive to innovation. From a U.S. perspective, perhaps it would
be cause for celebration that E.U. courts should go out of their way to
ensure that the United States will preserve its leadership in the
Internet search and e-commerce markets, as companies based in the
right law that 'all who derive value from a copyrighted work should pay for that use"'
(quoting Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321,
323 (D.NJ. 2002); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.7.2 (3d ed. 2005 &
Supp. 2006))).
259 See SAMUEL BLANKSON, META TAGS 57-59 (2007).
260 Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels,
Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (Belg.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.).
261 See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2006), afrd in
part, rev'd in part, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d
1106, 1110-24 (D. Nev. 2006); Bracha, supra note 12, at 1814-15; John S. Sieman,
Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C.
L. Rov. 885, 907-30 (2007).
262 Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels,
Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (Belg.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.).
263 Id.
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European Union suffer crippling copyright liability and stifling regula-
tion. Such a result, however, would hardly be consistent with the
European Union's declared policy of promoting freedom of expres-
sion using "information society services," and removing the "legal
obstacles" and "legal uncertainty" facing them. 264
V. Do INTERNATIONAL TREATIES PROHIBIT AN OPT-OUT
COPYRIGHT REGIME?
A. The International Law of Copyright Defenses and Safe Harbors
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and sev-
eral scholars have suggested that requiring notice of infringement to
be tendered to an Internet company prior to obtaining judicial review
of infringement claims may create a tension with international copy-
right treaties indicating that copyright formalities should not be
imposed. 265 They note that the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) 266 and the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (Copyright Treaty) ,267 as well as the Global Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade annex on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (GATT-TRIPs),268 limit copyright exceptions
and limitations to "certain special cases" that do not conflict with the
"normal exploitation" of a work or "unreasonably prejudice" a copy-
right holder's "legitimate interests. '269 These three criteria make up
the "three-step test" for compliance of copyright exemptions and limi-
264 ECD, supra note 172, at 1.
265 WIPO, supra note 43.
266 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
267 See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, April 12, 1997,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152 (1997) [hereinafter Copyright Treaty].
268 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1944) [hereinaf-
ter GAT-TRIPs].
269 Gregory R. Hagen & Nyall Engfield, Canadian Copyright Reform: P2P Sharing,
Making Available and the Three-Step Test, 3 U. OTTAwA L. & TECH. J. 477, 508 n.175
(2006) (citing Copyright Treaty, supra note 267, art. 10(1)); see alsoJulie E. Cohen,
WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REx'. 236 (1999); SAM RICKETSON, THE THREE-STEP TEST, DEEMED QUAN-
TITIES, LIBRARIJES AND CLOSED EXCEPTIONS 2-4, 55-78 (2002), http://wivw.copyright.
com.au/reports%20&%20papers/CCS0202Berne.pdf (detailing the three-step test
under article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, which "has come to be regarded as pro-
viding the international yardstick for exceptions to exclusive rights," and its applica-
tion to various provisions of Australia's Copyright Act).
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tations with the Berne Convention, GATT-TRIPs, and the Copyright
Treaty. These treaties also disfavor certain "formalities" imposed as a
condition precedent to securing copyright protection. 270
Despite the apparently sweeping language of the Berne Conven-
tion, Copyright Treaty, and GATT-TRIPs, the public interest oriented
exemptions and limitations provided for in the DMCA, First Amend-
ment, ECD, and ECHR may prevail for a couple of reasons.
One reason is that restricting Internet copyright liability to cases
involving a decision to disregard prior notifications of infringement
and requests to opt out may be perfectly consistent with the Berne
Convention and other copyright treaties. The Berne Convention
itself specifically permits legislative efforts to permit "fair" uses of
books and other works in "publications, broadcasts, or sound or visual
recordings. '" 271 Cases such as Kelly v. Arriba Soft, Field v. Google, and
Parker v. Google confirm that respecting opt-outs makes otherwise
infringing uses "fair."272 The failure of states party to the Berne Con-
vention and GATT-TRIPs to allege violations or institute proceedings
against one another based on the DMCA or ECD is powerful evidence
that exemptions for such new technologies do not violate the interna-
tional copyright treaties. 273 This is also evidenced by the decision of
these same states not to challenge exemptions from copyright for
other new technologies such as photocopying equipment, telecommu-
nications facilities, audio or video recorders, blank CDs or DVDs, MP3
players, or home computers. In each instance, legislation could have
been devised to comply with the Berne Convention and GATT-TRIPs
by compensating copyright owners for unauthorized exploitation of
their work using these devices, but such legislation has rarely been
270 Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction, in I INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 171, at INT-193 to INT-194 (overstating the
import of the Berne Convention by claiming that it "precludes all formalities that
might serve as preconditions for exercising rights in a judicial action").
271 Berne Convention, supra note 266, art. 10(2); see also Douglas L. Rogers,
Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use-Analyzing the Google Litigation to Unleash
Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 52 (2007) (discussing the
flexibility of the Berne Convention).
272 See supra notes 149-52, 161-66 and accompanying text.
273 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3) (b), opened for signa-
ture May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (stating
as a general rule that treaty interpretation should be guided by "subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty"); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorpo-
ration of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 758
n.111 (2001) ("How states in practice interpret and implement their international
obligations may affect the interpretation and content of international laws.").
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enacted. 274 Instead, state practice supports the legality of copyright
exceptions designed to promote the uses of such new technologies for
"research, education, libraries and other public-good uses. ' 275
Moreover, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has held that
exemptions based on a public policy such as promoting economic
growth or innovation may be entirely inconsistent with the Berne Con-
vention and GATT-TRIPs. The WTO concluded that the mere possi-
bility of charging commercial enterprises more money for their
exempt uses, and distributing the money to copyright holders, is insuf-
ficient evidence to support a finding that the exemption is inconsis-
tent with "normal exploitation" of the work.276 Simply because one
can imagine copyright holders earning extra revenue by exploiting
their works by means of lawsuits and threats against Internet compa-
nies does not mean that such a scenario represents "normal exploita-
274 The representative of the major movie studios in the United States proposed
that the manufacturers of home video recorders (VCRs) sit down with him and nego-
tiate a "reasonable" copyright fee, and that in the absence of a voluntary agreement
the U.S. Congress legislate a mandatory copyright fee. SeeJAMES LARDNER, FAST FOR-
WARD 228-62 (1987). His association claimed that unless such legislation were passed,
.the audiovisual marketplace [would] become a barren wasteland of programming
that does not . . . entertain." Id. at 229; see also Catherine Yang, A Rising Chorus of
Music Downloaders?, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 2003, at 96, available at http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/03_39/b3851 109.htm (discussing the attempts of peer-
to-peer file-sharing services to negotiate with the recording industry).
275 J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 46 (1997) ("Against this background,
the developed countries cannot use Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement to prevent
developing countries from applying limitations and exceptions parallel to those
already recognized in state practice, with a view to encouraging price discrimination
and other concessions in favor of research, education, libraries and other public-good
uses. On the contrary, it is the participation of developing countries in future discus-
sions about these issues that should help to determine the outer limits of the 'fair use'
doctrine in international law."), quoted in Rogers, supra note 271, at 59 n.266.
276 See Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 6.183,
WT/DS160/R Uune 15, 2000) (reporting that the U.S. "homestyle" exemption
allowing thousands of bars and restaurants to play music for paying customers using
televisions and radios without seeking permission or paying compensation to copy-
right owners did not violate Berne Convention or GATTf-TRIPs because use did not
.enter into economic competition with the ways that right holders normally extract
economic value from that right to the work ... and thereby deprive them of signifi-
cant or tangible commercial gains"); id. 6.182 ("[Iln our view, not every use of a
work, which in principle is covered by the scope of exclusive rights and involves com-
mercial gain, necessarily conflicts with the normal exploitation of that work. If this
were the case, hardly any exception or limitation could pass the test . . .");
Dinwoodie, supra note 273, at 762 (writing that the WTO panel was influenced by the
fact that affected bars and restaurants had not "been a significant source of revenue
collection" for copyright holders in the past).
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tion" of their works. If that were so, then the absence of liability for
manufacturers of photocopying equipment, telephones, audio or
video recorders, blank CDs or DVDs, MP3 players, or home computers
would constitute violations of GATT-TRIPs and would give rise to
WTO claims and counterclaims on a scale that dwarf the current trade
war between the United States and China.
2 77
B. Reconciling Specific National Limitations on Copyright with Broad
Assertions of Exclusive Rights Under International Law
Copyright holders could claim exceedingly broad rights against
Internet service providers under international law. Such an argument
could be based on the principle that international treaties preempt
any domestic copyright defenses that conflict with the "normal
exploitation" of a work or "unreasonably prejudice" a copyright
holder's "legitimate interests." 278  Internet service providers may
emphasize in response that all copyright limitations prejudice a copy-
right holder's interest to some degree, and that international treaties
do not preempt most such limits.
As the source of more specific and focused principles, copyright
limitations such as the DMCA and ECD, rather than the vague lan-
guage of the "three-step test" set forth in the Berne Convention,
GATT-TRIPs, and the Copyright Treaty should control the resolution
of Internet copyright disputes. 279 The more specific rule takes prece-
dence over the more general one under the maxim lex specialis derogat
277 The current trade war is mostly one-sided, with China making strenuous efforts
to prevent U.S. automobiles, entertainment media, and search engines from compet-
ing effectively with their Chinese counterparts. See David Barboza, Suspicions in U.S.
That China Has Put Ban on Hollywood Films, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at C3 (noting
that China banned U.S. films from being exhibited in possible retaliation for a U.S.
WTO complaint based on infringement in China of copyrights in books, music, mov-
ies, and other works); Mark Drajem, China Must Revamp Auto Component Tax Rules,
WIFO Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 18, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
sid=aaxWbjT_2ylU&pid=20601082 (noting that China required U.S. and European
automobile manufacturers to pay twice the tariff rate on imported parts as their Chi-
nese counterparts); US Search Engines 'Hijacked' in China: Analysts, AGENCE FRANCE-
PliSSE, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g8nFY8uu
EryolKV2iAGgCjr5SpH2Gg (discussing fact that China has redirected traffic intended
for U.S. search engines to their Chinese competitors).
278 Copyright Treaty, supra note 267, art. 10; GATT-TRIPs, supra note 268, at 1202;
Berne Convention, supra note 266, art. 9.
279 See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 214, at 307 (characterizing the three-step test as
"open-ended" and as "inevitably lead[ing] to unsatisfactory results").
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legi generali.280 For example, a German appellate court held that a
unique procedure and statutory license covering digital reproductions
using CD burners applied, notwithstanding copyright holders' appeal
to the vaguely worded "'three-step-test"' of the Berne Convention and
TRIPs Agreement. 281
In the United States, where the DMCA safe harbors are embodied
in a federal statute rather than an international directive promulgated
by a treaty-based body, treaties and statutes are both the supreme laws
of the land, 282 among which the more specific generally controls. 283
The U.S. Supreme Court construes the maxim lex specialis derogat legi
generali as a "warning against applying a general provision when doing
so would undermine limitations created by a more specific provi-
sion. ' 284 Under U.S. law, even a constitutional power may give way to
a more specific statute, as when the claim to broad executive powers
in the Steel Seizure case gave way to a more specific act of Congress. 28 5
In the European Union, a conflict between rules of international
law would be at stake, and as the International Court of Justice has
declared, "it is well understood that, in practice, rules of [general]
280 See Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law: Difficulties from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 59,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, (Apr. 13, 2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
guide/L_9.htm ("The idea that special enjoys priority over general has a long pedi-
gree in international jurisprudence as well. Its rationale is well expressed already by
Grotius: ... 'Among agreements which are equal.., that should be given preference
which is most specific and approaches most nearly to the subject in hand, for special
provisions are ordinarily more effective than those that are general.'" (quoting HUGO
GROTlus, DEJURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, bk. II, § XXIX, at 428 games Brown Scott
ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) (1625))).
281 P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVIRON-
MENT 26 (2003), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&evies-report.pdf (cit-
ing Landgericht Stuttgart [LG] [trial court], June 15, 2001, ZUM 2001, p. 614,
affirmed by Oberlandesgerichts Stuttgart [OLG] (Stuttgart Regional Court of Appeal],
Apr. 9, 2001, 4 U 142/01 (Zentralstelleffir Private Uberspielungsrechte v. Hlewlett Packard)).
282 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("Our constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently to be regarded in courts
ofjustice, as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself with-
out the aid of any legislative provision.").
283 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992) (citing
Crawford Fitting Co. v.J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987)); Int'l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-94 (1987).
284 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996).
285 SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 588-89
(1952); see also Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of War-
rantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amend-
ment, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 147, 186-89 (2006) (applying the Court's standard
as set forth in Steel Seizure to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)).
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international law can, by agreement, be derogated from particular
cases or as between particular parties. ' 28 6 Even the right to life may
be subject to this principle, for example, as respects the law of armed
conflict.287 The principal exceptions to this rule arise when a treaty
provision embodies binding jus cogens norms or where a derogation
based on a more specific municipal law would be inconsistent with the
fundamental purpose of a treaty so as to run afoul of the duty to enact
it in good faith.2 88 Neither of these exceptions would apply to the
DMCA or ECD as derogations from the Berne Convention, GATT-
TRIPs, or the Copyright Treaty. The right to an opt-in, as opposed to
an opt-out, system of copyright complaints hardly rises to the same
level as genocide, torture, or slavery,2 89 and is not needed to achieve
the purpose of a copyright treaty.
Copyright limitations may also take precedence because they
were enacted or re-enacted later in time than an allegedly inconsistent
copyright treaty. The DMCA and ECD were ratified after the Berne
Convention, GATT-TRIPs, and possibly the Copyright Treaty as well.
Both the United States and most E.U. members signed and/or ratified
the Berne Convention and GATT-TRIPs prior to enacting the DMCA
or ECD, respectively.290 They did the same with respect to the Copy-
286 North Sea Cont'l Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J 3, 42
(Feb. 20), cited in Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 280, 1 79 n.94. For more sources on
the application of this principle in Europe, see Carsten T. Ebenroth & Thomas J.
Dillon, Jr., Gaining the Competitive Edge: Access to the European Market Through Bilateral
Commercial Treaties and Taxation Strategies, 28 TEX. INT'L LJ. 269, 279 n.34 (1993).
287 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.CJ. 226, 239-40 (8 July), cited in Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 280, at 96.
288 A jus cogens norm "'is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character.'" Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1198 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.
1992)), reh'granted en banc, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). At the risk of being repeti-
tive, the acquiescence of states party to these treaties in broad exemptions for repro-
duction and telecommunications facilities would belie any contention that allowing
an exemption to exist for similar conduct in the Internet context would strike at the
fundamental purpose of these treaties. See Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J.
15, 23 (28 May) (stating that derogation from a treaty that would undermine its fun-
damental purpose is invalid).
289 These are perhaps the most often-cited examples of jus cogens norms. See, e.g.,
Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1197-1200; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987).
290 The United States had ratified the Berne Convention by 1989, see Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), as most European countries had by a
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right Treaty if you consider the date of signature and/or ratification
(typically 1996 or 1998) rather than of entry into force (2002) to be
controlling.29 1 Under the maxim lex posterior derogat legi anteriori, and
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute on
point (such as the DMCA) or treaty may override a prior inconsistent
treaty. 292 As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "[A] treaty will be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless
[an inconsistent] purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly
expressed." 293 It would be remarkable if either Congress or the Euro-
pean Union intended its specific legislation in the field of Internet
copyright to have been rendered moot from the outset by the Berne
Convention or TRIPs.294
Finally, adopting an absolutist approach to international copy-
right treaties would lead to incongruous results. It would mean that
copyright may not be subjected to modest conditions or exceptions
much earlier date, see Leonard D. DuBoff et al., Out of Unesco and Into Berne: Has
United States Participation in the Berne Convention for International Copyright Protection
Become Essential?, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 204 & n.9 (1985).
291 The United States signed the WIPO Copyright Treaty in 1996, and ratified it in
1998 in the same legislation that enacted the DMCA. It needed no ratification by
many of the European countries that signed it in 1996 because they are civil law coun-
tries that adopt a "monist" perspective on treaties that makes them immediately self-
executing. See Copyrighted Broadcast Programming on the Internet: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 5
(2000) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright, Copyright Office of the
U.S., Library of Congress); WIPO, Parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (2006), avail-
able at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/wct.pdf; Geller, supra note
270, at § 3[2] [a] (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
31-34 (6th ed., 2003)); PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 16-23
(1995).
292 Vienna Convention, supra note 273, art. 30(3)-(4); MALGOStA FITZMAURICE &
OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAw OF TREATIES 321 (2005); SEVED ALI
SADAT-AKHAVI, METHODS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN TREATIES 83 (2003);
WTO, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORTS 1998, at 2168 (2001); Richard Szawlowski, The
Time Factor in the Law of International Treaties, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 204, 204-05 (1992)
(book review).
293 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
294 Notably, several U.S. courts have held that the Berne Convention provides no
basis for overcoming specific statutory defenses to copyright claims once those
defenses have been erected by Congress. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1998) ("'No right or interest in a work
eligible for protection under this title may be claimed by virtue of... the provisions of
the Berne Convention.... Any rights in a work eligible for protection tinder this title
that derive from this title ... shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of ... the
provisions of the Berne Convention."' (quoting Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988 § 4(a)(3), 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2006)) (alterations in original)).
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such as those represented by the fair use or "brief quotations"
defenses or safe harbors for online intermediaries, but that the rights
of free expression and access to information could be trampled by
unreasonably broad copyright liability.295 Why an economic right
should take priority over a right fundamental to democracy in this
manner is baffling. Freedom of expression is a "transcendent" right
that serves as the basis of all others, even the right to life. 2 96
VT. THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: WILL DIGITAL LIBRARIES AND
ONLINE VIDEOS SURVIVE?
In a spate of recent cases, copyright owners have sued Google for
making-or allowing users to make-their texts or videos searchable
and retrievable over the Internet. The plaintiffs in each of the cases
allege that Google must seek permission from copyright owners prior
to including their content in a search engine, rather than including it
subject to a right of copyright owners to opt out. Google is respond-
ing to each of the cases with the argument that its purpose of improv-
ing accessibility of information over the Internet, coupled with the
very limited amount of copyrighted material that it displays to its
295 Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brussels,
Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (BeIg.) ( Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.) (adopting this
approach by subjecting freedom of expression to "formalities" imposed by copyright
legislation); Hugenholtz, supra note 189, at 349 (criticizing this approach).
296 The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently maintained that free-
dom of expression is essential to a functioning democracy. See Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946). Many scholars have noted that suppression of free expres-
sion and of the public's access to information often results in massive violations of the
right to life, because civil society is then hindered from correcting harmful policies by
debating and deciding on reform efforts (Nazi Germany being the most obvious
example). See, e.g., PATHS TO PEACE (Miriam Fendius Elman ed., 1997) (presenting
numerous case studies suggesting that democracy and domestic policy have a large
influence on peace); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 186-88 (1999)
(describing the role of uncensored media and political dissidents in criticizing and
reforming policies that lead to widespread starvation and death); Timothy Besley &
Robin Burgess, Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theoy and Evidence from
India, 117 Q.J. oF ECON. 1415, 1422-45 (2002) (containing empirical data to similar
effect); Amartya Sen, What's the Point of Press Freedom? (May 3, 2004), http://www.
wan-press.org/article3881.html?varrecherche=amartya+sen ("It is, thus, not at all
astonishing that no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country
with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press."). But cf Myhrvold
Hanssen, A Critique of Amartya Sen's Argument on Democracy and Famine of
1966-67 (June 2003), http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org/MyhrvoldHanssenBihar
Famine.rtf (describing a famine in post-independence India when the press was prob-
ably freer than under British colonial censorship).
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users, and the availability of an opt-out process, mean that its activities
are protected as fair uses or pursuant to the DMCA safe harbors.
A. Google News: Are Headlines and Story Leads Copyrightable?
The first of these Internet copyright cases filed against Google
involved the international newsgathering service Agence France-
Presse (AFP), which sought $17.5 million in damages for the alleged
"reproduction and display of AFP headlines, story leads, and photo-
graphs on an Internet news aggregation service called Google
News."'29 7 Google responded that AFP's headlines and story leads
were too short and fact-based to be copyrightable, that AFP had
already licensed its content to the news sites linked to by Google in
any event, that AFP and its licensees knew how to but failed to opt out
of being located and linked to by Google, that any violation of AFP
license agreements by news sites could not be attributed to Google
given the DMCA safe harbors, and that even assuming that Google
reproduced or displayed AFP's content without authorization, it
increased the flow of traffic to AFP's licensees-that is, made a fair
use. 29 8 In support of its motion for partial summary judgment,
Google cited a number of cases holding that titles, headlines, and sin-
gle paragraphs of copyrighted works are not protectable in the sense
that copying them without more could give rise to an infringement
lawsuit.2 9 9 Google's expert witness also pointed out that Google users
clicked on links to news articles, and visited the websites of the arti-
cles' licensees as a result, about 400% more often when both the head-
lines and a snippet of text from the article were provided compared to
when only a headline was provided.3 00 Although the parties settled on
297 Response in Opposition to Google, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 1, Agence France Presse v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05CV00546-GK (D.D.C. Jan.
29, 2007); Caroline McCarthy, Agence France-Presse, Google Settle Copyright Dispute, CNET
NEWS.COM (Apr. 6, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1030_3-6174008.html.
298 Google's Answer and Counter-Claims at 17-29, Agence France-Presse v.
Google, Inc., No. 1:05CV00546-GK (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2007).
299 Google's Reply to AFP's Opposition to Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing
Count II (Headlines) for Lack of Protectable Subject Matter at 4, Agence France-
Presse v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05CV00546-GK (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2007) (citing Nihon
Keizai Shimbum, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999);
Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996); Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Dumon,
Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 710 n.2 (7th Cir. 1972)).
300 Second Supplement of Report for Wiley Rein & Fielding at 1, Agence France-
Presse v. Google, Inc., No. l:05CV00546-GK (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2007).
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undisclosed financial terms,30' Google's arguments seemed to hold
some promise of success, judging by the authorities it cited.
Within the European Union, a Belgian court has held Google lia-
ble for reproducing the headlines and snippets from news articles.
The court concluded that indexing articles in Google News is not
analogous to linking to or providing a searchable index of them
hosted elsewhere in a manner that would likely be exempt from liabil-
ity under the ECD. In that case, the court distinguished between cases
involving an ISP that links users to third party content, and reproduc-
tion by the ISP itself.30 2 The court did not consider the sort of expert
testimony Google prepared for the U.S. case regarding how aggrega-
tion in a news search engine enhances readership. Nor did it have to
grapple with the U.S. case law on headlines and short paragraphs.
One might predict that more sophisticated analyses will be forthcom-
ing as courts within the European Union become more familiar with
the statistical evidence and legal arguments against holding Internet
service providers liable for copyright infringement based on their role
as aggregators and categorizers of information.
B. Google Book Search: Book Previews As Noninfringement and Fair Use
Two cases filed in federal court in New York involve the allega-
tion that Google's efforts to expand its search engine into the domain
of the printed word-which it calls Google Book Search-infringes
the copyrights of authors and publishers. 30 3 Google has reached
agreements with more than seventeen library systems in the United
States and European Union to scan millions of mostly public domain
books, along with millions of copyrighted books held by the University
301 See McCarthy, supra note 297. As the settlement was reported, it allowed
Google not only to continue what it was doing but also to "post AFP content ... on
other Google services." Id. Google has since created a special subsection of its web-
site for AFP articles, located at http://afp.googlecom.
302 See Tribunal de premiere Instance de Bruxelles [court of first instance] Brus-
sels, Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10 928/C (Beig.) (Copiepresse SCRL v. Google Inc.).
303 For a fairly objective description of the project from the period of its inception,
see DAVID A. VISE, THE GOOGLE STORY 229-39 (2005). For a description of the project
from the point of view of the publishers, see Complaint at 1-4, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc.
v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 19, 2005). For descriptions of the
project from the point of view of Google and its partner libraries, see, for example,
Press Release, Google Inc., Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14, 2004), http:/
/www.google.com/press/pressrel/printjlibrary.html; Press Release, Univ. of Michi-
gan, Google/U-M Project Opens the Way to Universal Access to Information (Dec.
14, 2004), http://www.umich.edu/news/index.html?Releases/2004/DecO4/library/
index; University of Michigan, Google/U-M Project Questions and Answers, http://
www.ur.umich.edu/0405/Dec]3_04/lib-qa.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
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of Michigan and University of California library systems.3 0 4 One case,
filed by a number of publishers with the coordination of the Associa-
tion of American Publishers, seeks an injunction against alleged
infringement of copyrights when Google arrives at agreements with
university libraries to scan books into digital format, makes the books
searchable by keyword or bibliographic information, and displays
"snippets" of text-a few lines-in response to users' searches. 30 5 The
other case, filed by the Authors Guild on behalf of a handful of
authors of prose and poetry, but requesting certification as a class
action covering the authors of millions of books in the University of
Michigan libraries, seeks statutory damages of up to $150,000 per
book.30 6 Google claims to be acting conservatively with respect to
copyright 30 7 and tells authors and publishers: "We're happy to remove
your book from our [Library Project] search results at any time,just as
we do for website publishers. You'll need to ... identify[ ] yourself as
the owner and let[ ] us know which books to exclude."308 Authors
and publishers object to this procedure, with the president of the
Association of American Publishers stating, for example, that it "shifts
the responsibility for preventing infringement to the copyright owner
304 George Pike, Legal Update 2007: Where the Lawsuits Are, INFO. TODAY, Nov. 2007,
at 1; The Google Six: UC System Joins Google's Scan Plan, LIBRARYJ. ACAD. NEwswIRE, Aug.
10, 2006, http://www.libraryjournal.com/info/CA6361500.html.
305 Answer, 3-4, 25, 27, The McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Google Inc., Civil Action No.
05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. answer filed Nov. 8, 2005). The libraries involved in the project
include the University of Michigan libraries (contributing seven to eight million
books), the University of California libraries (contributing "millions" of books), the
Bodleian Library at Oxford University (contributing about one million books from
the nineteenth century), Stanford University libraries (contributing perhaps millions
of books), Harvard University libraries (contributing about 40,000 books), the New
York Public Library (contributing tens of thousands of books), the Bavarian state
libraries, the Complutense University libraries in Madrid, and others as well. SeeViSE,
supra note 303, at 238; Band, supra note 115, at 36; Jeffrey R. Young, U. of California
System's 100 Libraries Join Google's Controversial Book-Scanning Project, CHRON. HIGHER
ED., Aug. 9, 2006, http://chronicle.com/free/2006/08/2006080901t.htm; Press
Release, Harvard Univ. Library, Harvard's Digitization Project with Google (Dec. 14,
2004), http://hul.harvard.edu/news/2004_1214_news.html.
306 Complaint at 13, Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Sept. 20, 2005).
307 See Google Inc., Librarian Center (2006), http://www.google.com/librarian
center/articles/0606_03.html ("Since whether a book is in the public domain is a
tricky legal question, we err on the side of caution and display at most a few snippets
until we have determined that the book has entered the public domain. These books
may be in the public domain, but until we can be sure, we show them as if they are
not.").
308 Google Book Search Publisher Questions, http://books.google.com/google
books/publisherjlibrary.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
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rather than the user, turning every principle of copyright law on its
ear.'3°9
Scholars writing about the case have generated a variety of argu-
ments in support of each side's contentions.3 1 0 There are many rea-
309 Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Publishers, Google Library Project Raises Serious
Questions for Publishers and Authors (Aug. 12, 2005) (on file with author), quoted in
Band, supra note 115; see also Fair Use: Its Effects on Commerce and Industry: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 109th Cong. 62-67 (testi-
mony of Paul Aiken, Executive Director, Authors Guild, Inc.) (Nov. 16, 2005), http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109-house-hearings&docid=f:
27003.pdf [hereinafter Aiken]; Letter from Peter Givler, Executive Director, The
Association of American University Presses (AAUP) to Alexander Macgillivray, Senior
Intellectual Property and Product Counsel, Google, Inc. (May 20, 2005) (on file with
AAUP) [hereinafter AAUP], available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/may2005/nf20050523-9039.htm (arguing that the "opt-out" procedure
"ignores the fundamental exclusive fight of copyright owners to make copies in the
first place, and . . . ignores the exclusive right of distribution").
310 Compare, e.g., Band, supra note 115 (arguing that based on Kelly v. Arriba Soft
and other case law, "Google's copying of entire books into its database is reasonable
for the purpose of the effective operation of the search engine .... will not diminish
the market for the books.... [and] permit[s] owners to opt out of the Library Project
altogether," so that a "court correctly applying the fair use doctrine as an equitable
rule of reason should permit Google's Library Project to proceed"), Bracha, supra
note 12, at 1856-60 (defending Google's opt-out framework for its book search func-
tionality under existing law), Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Over-
load: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 187-88 (2007) ("In a
series of cases involving software, courts have protected users' rights to make an inter-
mediate copy of a work in order to reverse engineer its noncopyrightable elements...
[and have held that] a software coder is entitled to make a copy of a work in order to
discover how it works, and to replicate those elements of it that are not copyrightable.
The doctrine appears tailor-made for the Google Library project, which intends not
to provide full copies of copyrighted works to searchers, but only small snippets of
text deemed relevant to their queries."), and Travis, supra note 146, at 126-39 (argu-
ing that Google Book Search's "transformative" purpose to categorize and improve
users' understanding of and access to the universe of published books, coupled with
fact that most books Google makes searchable are already published nonfiction
works, absence of evidence of harm to book sales, and actual evidence of increased
sales of searchable and preview-enabled books, render the project a fair use of copy-
righted books), with CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH PRO-
JECT: IS ONLINE INDEXING A FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW? (2005), http://www.
opencrs.com/rpts/RS22356_20051228.pdf (questioning the legality of the project),
Elizabeth Hanratty, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 10
(questioning the legality of Google's scanning and display of snippets of library
books), Manali Shah, Comment, Fair Use and the Google Book Search Project: The Case for
Creating Digital Libraries, 15 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 569, 594-609 (2007) (questioning
whether Google Book Search is fair use under existing four-factor test), Siva Vaidhy-
anathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1207, 1225-30 (2007) (arguing that "Google cannot win" against publishers and
authors on the legality of its book search functionality), and Matt Williams, Recent
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sons to believe, however, that Google Book Search may constitute a
lawful use of library books to create an "information age" version of a
card catalog.
First, Google is not displaying entire books, nor even entire pages
from books, but merely bibliographic information about books along
"with a few sentences of [a user-provided] search term in context."311
This distinguishes Google's case from cases typically cited by publish-
ers and Google's other critics as not finding a fair use, such as Napster,
Grokster, or MP3.com, which involved the distribution of entire songs
and albums,31 2 or Video Pipeline,313 which involved entire frames and
scenes from motion pictures.3 14 Second, there is a long line of
authority in American copyright law to the effect that the reproduc-
tion or display of paragraph-length snippets from copyrighted work is
not an infringement standing alone and cannot give rise to a copy-
right lawsuit.315 Third, a finding of fair use is favored when only a
Second Circuit Opinions Indicate That Google's Library Project Is Not Transformative, 25 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303 (2007) (asserting that Google Book Search is not a fair use
because it does not add new descriptive commentary to books so as to be "transforma-
tive" under an unduly narrow reading of the law (citing Bill Graham Archives v.
Dodsley Kinnersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2006))).
311 Google, Inc., Google Book Search Common Questions, http://books.google.
com/googlebooks/common.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).
312 For instances of Google's critics citing or alluding to these cases, see Aiken,
supra note 309, at 75; Andrew Albanese, AAP Sues Google over Scan Plan, LIBR. J., Nov.
15, 2005, at 17; Band, supra note 115, at 43; Lewis Smith, Publishers Wrestle with Digital
Era, TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 2005, at 33; Sarah Lai Stirland, Google's Book Project
Panned by Publishing Official, 8 TECH. DAILY (2006); Jeffrey R. Young, Publishing Groups
Say Google's Library-Scanning Effort May Violate Copyright Laws, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED.,
Feb. 18, 2005, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v51/i24/24aO3501.htm.
313 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321,
328-29 (D.N.J. 2002).
314 For a publishing industry source's citation of this case to question the legality
of Google Book Search, see AAUP, supra note 309, at 3-4.
315 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548-49
(1985) (requiring "generous verbatim excerpts" totaling about 300-400 words in all,
or about two full pages of a book, in order to reject the fair use defense to a claim of
copyright infringement); Nihon Keizai Shimbum, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166
F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999) (copying a single paragraph of a news story for competitive
purposes did not constitute copyright infringement); Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith
Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (copying a single recipe out of a collection
of recipes did not constitute copyright infringement); Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (copying and publishing a single sentence for
competitive purposes did not constitute copyright infringement, but copying ten lines
might); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 710 n.2 (7th Cir. 1972)
(copying a single paragraph for competitive purposes did not constitute copyright
infringement).
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small portion or reduced-size version of a copyrighted work is distrib-
uted or displayed by the defendant, even though it may have repro-
duced the work in its entirety to reach that point.31 6 Fourth, fair use is
more likely to be found where factual and nonfiction works are cop-
ied-as most of the library books copied by Google are-than where
highly creative fictional or poetic works are. 31 7 Fifth, the fact that
book sales have increased substantially in the period since Google
began scanning copyrighted books in July of 2004318 shows a lack of
316 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir.
2006) (finding that "copying the entirety of a work is sometimes necessary to make a
fair use of the [work]" where the author of a book copied plaintiffs work in its
entirety in order to reproduce it in reduced-size form as part of a broader, transform-
ative work canvassing not only plaintiffs work but the work of many others as well);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a display of
plaintiffs photographs in a miniaturized "thumbnail" form was a fair use in part
because such a display was not an adequate substitute for viewing plaintiffs works in
their full-sized form); Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 521 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that defendant's copying of plaintiff's works in their entirety constituted no
further use of plaintiffs works than had to be made to "produce a marketable collec-
tors' guide" displaying plaintiff's works in reduced-size form, and that "the cases are
clear that a complete copy is not per se an unfair use"); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977
F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where defendant engaged in
"wholesale copying" of plaintiff's software in order to produce compatible software,
"[t] he fact that an entire work was copied does not.., preclude finding a fair use....
In fact, where the ultimate (as opposed to direct) use is as limited as it was here, the
factor is of very little weight").
317 L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that where defendant reproduces and displays copyrighted material that is
"informational and factual and news," this fact "strongly favors" a finding of fair use);
Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., No. 81 Civ. 6001, 1984 WL 2119, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1984), affd, 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Since copyright protec-
tion for compilations of factual material is at odds with the basic thrust of the copy-
right laws, the scope of permissible fair use is greater.. . ." (citation omitted)); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.NJ. 1977) (find-
ing that defendant's decision to reproduce a work that is "more of diligence than of
originality or inventiveness" means that it enjoys "greater license to use portions of
[it] under the fair use doctrine than . . . if a creative work had been involved").
318 SeeVISF, supra note 303, at 235 (indicating that the first Google book scanners
were moved into the University of Michigan libraries in July of 2004). The publishing
industry in the United States earned $1.5 billion more in 2005 than 2004 (for a 5.9%
increase), $1 billion more in 2006 than 2005 (for a 3.2% increase), and $1.5 billion
more in 2007 than in 2006 (for a 4.4% increase). See Press Release, Book Indus. Study
Group, Book Industry TRENDS 2008 (May 31, 2008) (on file with author), http://
www.bisg.org/news/press.php?pressid=49; Press Release, Book Indus. Study Group,
Book Industry TRENDS 2007 (June 1, 2007) (on file with author), http://www.bisg.
org/news/press.php?pressid=42; Press Release, Book Indus. Study Group, Book
Industry TRENDS 2006 (May 22, 2006), http://v.bisg.org/news/press.php?pressid
=35.
[VOL. 84:1
OPTING OUT OF THE INTERNET
harm to their established markets and therefore a fair use. 319 The
book industry's net revenues grew twice as fast as the overall economy
in 2007.320 Although publishers may be able to imagine licensing
deals with Google that would transfer huge sums of money to them,
these deals should not be utilized to prevent a finding of fair use.321
Finally, and most importantly, the fact that Google is acting in the
public interest by expanding access to information and comparison of
books dictates a finding of fair use. 322
C. Google Video and YouTube: Inadequate Control Over Users' Content
The last category of cases to be discussed here involves online
video sites such as YouTube and Google Video. These sites obtain
videos for users to watch in one of two ways: they either partner with
copyright owners who supply specific clips for viewing with permis-
319 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 & n.33
(1984) ("[W]hen one considers ... that [taping television programs using a VCR to
watch them later] merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is repro-
duced .... does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair
use .... Moreover, the time-shifter no more steals the program by watching it once
than does the live viewer ....") (internal citation omitted).
320 Compare Book Indus. Study Group, Book Indus. TRENDS 2008, supra note 318,
withJeannine Aversa, Economy Skids to a Near Hall, USA TODAY ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-02-27-1086066499_x.htm.
321 See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141, 145 n.l
(2d Cir. 1998) ("Copyright owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative
markets, which they would not 'in general develop or license others to develop,' by
actually developing or licensing others to develop those markets. Thus, by developing
or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative
uses of its own creative work, a copyright owner plainly cannot prevent others from
entering those fair use markets."); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d
109, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that copyright holders are "not entitled to a licens-
ing fee for a work that otherwise qualifies for the fair use defense," because it is not a
sufficient "argument for actual market harm ... that the defendant has deprived [the
copyright holder] of a licensing fee"). But cf Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an impact on potential licensing
royalties could be considered as weighing against a fair use finding where a workable
market already existed for corporate photocopying centers to pay a licensing fee to
copyright holders).
322 See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 & n.14
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that reproduction and distribution of a copyright owner's
works in their entirety was a fair use where done "for the purpose of informing the
public about the problems associated with [plaintiff's products]," which was "in the
public interest"); Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The scope of the [fair use] doctrine is undoubtedly wider
when the interest conveyed relates to matters of high public concern . . ").
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sion, or they allow users to upload videos that may turn out to be
copyrighted by a third party.323 YouTube requires users to affirm
and/or "warrant" that they, rather than YouTube, "own, or have the
necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permissions to use and
authorize YouTube to use" the videos they submit.324 YouTube states
that: "Anytime we become aware that a video or any part of a video on
our site infringes the copyrights of a third party, we will take it down
from the site."3 2 5 It instructs copyright owners: "If you believe that a
video on the site infringes your copyright, send us a copyright notice
and we will take it down." 326
After YouTube was purchased by Google Inc. for $1.65 billion,
the entertainment conglomerate Viacom sued Google and YouTube
for $1 billion in damages, alleging that more than 150,000 video clips
to which Viacom owned the copyrights had been viewed more than
1.5 billion times on YouTube, without Viacom's permission and with-
out the payment of any compensation. 327 YouTube is facing many
other complaints and/or notices of infringement, including those
filed by NBC Universal, the photojournalists of the L.A. News Agency,
the English Premier League, the National Music Publishers Associa-
tion,Japanese broadcasters (which alleged that 30,000 infringing clips
were on YouTube), etc. 328 Facing so many complaints, YouTube has
developed copyright protection "tools" that help owners find allegedly
infringing clips and prevent reloading of the same clip.3 29
Whether and to what extent YouTube may avail itself of the
DMCA safe harbors and fair use doctrine is disputed. In one of the
first judicial opinions to grapple with the issue, a court addressed You-
323 See, e.g., Michael Liedtke, Google Video Suit Could Signal YouTube Trouble Ahead,
USA TODAY ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-11-08-
google-sued x.htm.
324 YouTube Inc., Terms of Use, http://code.google.com/apis/youtube/terms.
html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Complaint at 2, 5, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103, 2007
WL 775611 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Viacom Complaint].
328 See First Amended Complaint, The Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd. v. You-
Tube, Inc., No. 07 CV 3582 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2007); Complaint, Dawg Music v.
YouTube Inc., No. 3:07-cv-02518-SI (N.D. Cal. filed May 7, 2007); Complaint, The
Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 CV 3582 (S.D.N.Y. filed
May 4, 2007), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 912; Complaint, Tur v. YouTube,
Inc., No. CV 06-4436-GAF (C.D. Cal. filed July 14, 2006); Associated Press, YouTube
Deletes 30,000 Files After Japanese Group Complains About Copyright Infringement, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/20/business/
ASTECJapan YouTubeCopyrights.php.
329 See Viacom Complaint, supra note 327, 40.
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Tube's motion for summary judgment based on the DMCA safe
harbors.330 The court declined to grant YouTube's motion, ruling
that more factual development would be necessary before it could
determine whether YouTube was disqualified from invoking the safe
harbors because it had the "right and ability to control such activity"
or received "a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity."'33 1 The court declared that these tests required an examina-
tion of whether YouTube did more than simply exercise its right and
ability to remove or block access to materials posted on its site or
stored in its system, for example by detecting and prescreening alleg-
edly infringing videos prior to any notification of infringement.3 32 As
another online video site, Veoh, has pointed out, the mere fact that
YouTube may delete allegedly infringing videos upon receiving
notice, and filter them out to avoid resubmission, does not demon-
strate the requisite control over postings under the DMCA:
The mere ability to control a central index does not give rise to the
ability to control infringing content. [The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has] held that "Google's ability to control its own index,
search results, and webpages does not give Google the right to con-
trol the infringing acts of third parties even though that ability
would allow Google to affect those infringing acts to some degree."
Here, Veoh responded to notices of infringement. Veoh's central
index and its ability to terminate access to certain files only evi-
dences an ability to control access to videos, not an ability to identify
and terminate infringing videos. 33 3
Regarding fair use, there is every reason to believe that You-
Tube's users are making fair use of copyrighted work, and that You-
Tube's own role constitutes fair use given its decision to respect opt-
outs. YouTube and its users are showing videos in greatly reduced size
and resolution compared to television or DVD displays, for the dis-
tinct purpose of categorizing and making videos searchable, and will
probably benefit the copyright owners whose short clips become well-
known and popular on YouTube. 33 4 In addition, many YouTube
330 Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV 06-4436-FMC AJWX, 2007 WL 1893635, at *1
(C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007).
331 Id. at *3-4 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006)).
332 Id. at *3.
333 Defendant Veoh Networks, Inc.'s Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sum-
maryJudgment at 23, 10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. C. 06-3926, 2007 WL
2888756 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 14, 2007) (internal citations omitted).
334 See Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608-27
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding a fair use for similar reasons); Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d
811, 818-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). Empirical research and evidence in litigated
Internet copyright cases have revealed that even the downloading of entire copy-
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videos are themselves parodies or are posted in order to permit users
to append satirical, informative, or critical commentary about the
videos or their stars.335 Readers doubting this fact are invited to type
into YouTube's search box the name of a famous politician or cultural
icon in their community or nation.
As other scholars have suggested, Google may have a more diffi-
cult time establishing that YouTube is entitled to an exception from
copyright under the law of the member states of the European Union.
To the extent that those states lack a general-purpose fair use excep-
tion, some of the considerations that weigh heavily in Google's favor
in the United States may not be as persuasive. 33 6 The Google News
decision suggests that the copyright exceptions of the E.U. member
states, to the extent that they focus on reviews, news reporting, and
the like-rather than calling for a broad-ranging consideration of a
use's purpose and effects as in the United States-may be less likely to
shield YouTube. Moreover, it also suggests that courts within the
European Union may be less likely to confer a copyright exception
based on freedom of exception on ISPs, particularly foreign ones,
than on traditional media outlets, particularly those based in E.U.
markets. Finally, its articulation of an apparently unlimited moral
right to prevent online "amputation" of one's work in the form of
quotations or samples leaves little room for the survival of free-wheel-
ing services like YouTube.
righted works from the Internet does not decrease, but probably helps increase, the
sales of such works by promoting sampling and the formation of tastes. See Felix
Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empir-
ical Analysis, 115 J. OF POL. ECON. 37, 38-40 (2007); Martin Peitz & Patrick Wael-
broeck, Why the Music Industry May Gain from Free Downloading: The Role of Sampling, 24
INT'LJ. OF INDUS. ORG. 907 (2006); Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Librar-
ies: An Agenda for Copyright Reform, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 830 n.428 (2006) (collecting
cases); Ramnath Chellappa & Shivendu Shivendu, Managing Piracy: Pricing and Sam-
pling Strategies for Digital Experience Goods in Vertically Segmented Markets, 16 INFO. Sys.
RES. 400 (2005).
335 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-88 (1994) (finding
that parody is a transformative use of copyrighted work that supports a finding of fair
use); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding that a display of television clips was transformative for fair use purposes
where they were accompanied by commentary); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d
1106, 1118-23 (D. Nev. 2006) (improving access to information over the Internet is a
transformative purpose consistent with fair use); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Net-
works, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that showing clips
was fair use because it was done for "the transformative purpose of enabling the
viewer to understand" the clips' underlying subject matter); Netcom 1, 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
336 Ganley, supra note 171, at 17-21 (discussing United Kingdom law).
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D. Weighing the Benefits and Harms of an Opt-Out Copyright System for
the Internet
American and European courts and policymakers face important
choices in the coming years about the future of online services. They
may elect to follow the lead of the U.S. courts in the Netcom, Napster,
and search engine cases, and of the European courts in a variety of
cases from Scientology through Google France, in recognizing ade-
quate breathing space for innovative new technologies and freedom
of expression in the digitally networked environment. Alternatively,
they could adhere to the highly restrictive framework adopted by the
Belgian court in the Copiepresse case. If the latter framework is
adopted throughout the European Union, the economic and public
policy effects will be manifold. This subpart briefly surveys some of
the likely costs and benefits, while leaving more extended considera-
tion of these costs and benefits to later works and other authors.
The costs of an opt-out rule fall into two main areas: those posed
to the human rights of authors, and those posed to the economic effi-
ciency of markets for copyrightable works. Human rights law recog-
nizes that sometimes freedom of expression may need to be limited by
laws absolutely necessary to protect the rights of others. 337 To the
extent that online intermediaries may enable widespread violations of
the statutory rights of third parties, an opt-out rule may make it
harder for such third parties to vindicate their rights by requiring ISPs
to seek their permission prior to hosting their works. Similarly, some
economic analyses of IP law contend that overuse of copyrighted or
trademarked works without compensation threatens to prevent those
creating new works from recouping their investment by charging
prices in excess of the cost of reproducing the works.33 8 When
authors or filmmakers must invest years of labor and thousands of dol-
lars producing a work that is then forwarded around the Internet free
of charge, further works may be abandoned as too costly to be
made. 339
337 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(2),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
338 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11, 20-21 (2003); William M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J.L. & ECON. 265, 266-71 (1987); see
also James Gibson, Re-reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 163, 173-74 (2004) (dis-
cussing how nonexcludability of databases discourages their development).
339 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 338, at 24.
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The benefits of an opt-out rule are ripe for further research.
They include access to information, freedom of expression, efficiency
and innovation, and jurisdictional uniformity.
First, an opt-out rule will allow more people to enjoy the vast new
opportunities for broader access to information and to the means of
mass communication that are opened up by Internet technologies.
Making sites like YouTube or Wikipedia automatically liable for the
postings of their users will result in widespread censorship and dele-
tion of user postings, and the potential closure of these services as
with Napster and Grokster.340 Applying the principles from the Bel-
gian Copiepresse case to Google Book Search or to search engines will
also result in vast quantities of political, historical, cultural, and eco-
nomic information being cleansed from the Internet and becoming
unavailable. 341 In the case of Google Book Search, it would mean that
hundreds of thousands of copyrighted books that are out-of-print and
may be available in only one or two libraries in the entire world could
not be indexed by keyword for discovery on the Internet. 342 With
regard to YouTube, the free expression problem posed by a choice
between seeking prior permission from every conceivable rights
holder or suffering the full force of copyright liability for actions of its
users, would shut down most of the site:
If YouTube, eBay, Yahoo!, Verizon, Comcast, and others face the
prospect of tens of millions of dollars in statutory damages for host-
ing, carrying, or linking to content whose provenance they cannot
determine, they will either go out of business or they will impose
restrictions on the content they will carry sufficiently onerous that
they would effectively lock down the Internet.3 43
340 See Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media As a
First Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1509, 1523 n.8 (2007); Jennifer Urban,
Internet Study Finds Questionable Use of Cease-and-Desist Notices, FACULTY FooTNoTEs, at 2
(Fall 2006), http://law.usc.edu/assets/docs/FINAL-footnotesO6.pdf; see generally Jen-
nifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown Notices
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 681-83 (2005) (considering how these censorship risks are likely to
affect availability of expression on the Internet).
341 See Travis, supra note 146, at 138-51; Travis, supra note 340, at 1550-65.
342 See Travis, supra note 146, at 97-98, 138-39; Brian Lavoie et al., Anatomy of
Aggregate Collections: The Example of Google Print for Libraries, 11 D-LIB MAG., Sept. 2005,
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/september05/lavoie/091avoie.html; Google Inc., Response
from the Editor to Walt Crawford, Libraries and Google/Google Book Search: No
Competition! (June 2006), http://www.google.com/librariancenter/articles/0606-
03.html (indicating only five percent of books held by libraries are still in print, i.e.,
on sale to consumers at stores).
343 Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. oF TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 101, 111 (2007).
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The problem with holding online video sites automatically liable for
their users' videos is similar to the problem with holding book pub-
lishers liable for illegal acts committed by their authors. Specifically,
sites like YouTube would be chilled from providing a forum for free-
wheeling social and political speech344 by the threat of injunctive
relief3 45 or onerous monetary liability. 346
Second, widespread adoption of the Belgian Copiepresse frame-
work will mean that Internet-enabled innovation will be sharply cur-
tailed, and the prospects will be quite bleak-not only for services like
Google and YouTube, but also for Web 2.0 and the Internet in gen-
eral. Europeans may continue to enjoy higher rates of broadband
connectivity at lower prices, 347 but they may not be able to participate
as actively in starting new Web 2.0 sites as they would be if E.U. mem-
bers enacted a broader fair use exception and construed online safe
harbors more like U.S. courts do.3 48 Online services need not even be
344 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 893-908 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 358 (1999); Robert
C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expres-
sion, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 299-315 (1979); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and
Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1, 5-7, 53-63 (1987). For similar arguments arising within
the European Union, see Hugenholtz, supra note 189, at 353-58.
345 Cf Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (lth Cir.
2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (lth Cir. 2001) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding Houghton Mifflin liable for copyright infringement in
a book it published).
346 Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (explaining that minor-
ity groups' expression could potentially be chilled if newspapers were held liable for
the advertisements they published).
347 See Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access As Antitrust and
Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1697, 1787-94 (2006).
348 A further development of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article, but
many other scholars have persuasively argued that overbroad copyrights have an
adverse effect on innovation in the software and Internet industries. See, e.g., Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 271-84 (2007);
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1386-90 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Philip
J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783,
800-05 (2007); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm,
49 VAND. L. REv. 483, 509-17 (1996); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for
Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1329, 1353-71 (1987); Robin A. Moore, Note, Fair
Use and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 944, 959-65 (2007); Gideon Parchomovsky
& Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1530-32 (2007); Pasquale,
supra note 310, at 40-63; C. Riley, The Need for Software Innovation Policy, 5 J. OF
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 589, 595-603 (2007); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity
of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy ofJustice Stevens, 74 FoRD-tAM L. REV.
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shut down entirely to be degraded and made less attractive to persons
seeking to access information and express ideas, as the furor over the
invasion of privacy triggered by Viacom's subpoena of YouTube's view-
ing records, broken down by time of viewing, login identifier, and
Internet protocol address shows. 349 Inquiries by courts and officials
and investigations into communications made over the Internet
threaten to chill users from utilizing the medium, lest their interests
become known:
In this era of public apprehension about the scope of the USAPA-
TRIOT Act, the FBI's (now-retired) "Carnivore" Internet search
program, and more recent highly-publicized admissions about polit-
ical litmus tests at the Department of Justice, rational book buyers
would have a non-speculative basis to fear that federal prosecutors
and law enforcement agents have a secondary political agenda that
could come into play when an opportunity presented itself.... [I]f
word were to spread over the Net-and it would-that the [govern-
ment] had demanded and received Amazon's list of customers and
their personal purchases, the chilling effect on expressive e-com-
merce would frost keyboards across America. Fiery rhetoric quickly
would follow and the nuances of the subpoena (as actually written
and served) would be lost as the cyberdebate roiled itself to a furi-
ous boil. One might ask whether this court should concern itself
with blogger outrage disproportionate to the government's actual
demand of Amazon. The logical answer is yes, it should: well-
founded or not, rumors of an Orwellian federal criminal investiga-
tion into the reading habits of Amazon's customers could frighten
countless potential customers into canceling planned online book
purchases, now and perhaps forever. 35
0
This prediction is borne out by the reaction to the court's grant-
ing of the Viacom subpoena, which elicited so much fear and outrage
that Viacom voluntarily withdrew its request for individualized viewing
1831, 1832-41 (2006); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2365-2420 (1994).
349 See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1170, 1175-78,
1175 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (overruling First Amendment and Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), objections to subpoena of YouTube viewing records,
even though similar cases had barred subpoenas of Amazon's Internet book transac-
tions in civil lawsuits, and the ECPA states that providers of "remote computing ser-
vice[s] to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents"
of any electronic communication stored on subscribers' behalf (first quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2702 (a) (2) (2006) and then citing In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL,
LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Va. 2008); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Ama-
zon.com, 246 F.R.D. 570, 572 (W.D. Wis. 2007)).
350 In re CrandJury Subpoena to Amazon.com, 246 F.R.D. at 570, 572-73.
[VOL. 84:1
OPTING OUT OF THE INTERNET
records, which the court had already granted despite the palpable
conflict with the First Amendment.351 Nor was concern limited to an
overheated "cyberdebate"; an Associated Press headline was "Privacy
Protections Disappear with a Judge's Order."352 As a YouTube video
watched over 600,000 times asked rhetorically, who would shop at a
bookstore, or attend a movie theater, where the guards searched one's
pockets, purse, and car?35 3
Finally, the development of diverging principles for resolving
Internet copyright disputes which may occur between the European
Union, United States, and Asia, for example, if the Copiepresse frame-
work becomes recognized as authoritative in the European Union,
while the Arriba Soft framework persists in the United States, could
distort the flow of capital away from the most talented innovators and
most promising technologies. Strict opt-in rules would result in the
flight of businesses and capital focused on investing in Internet tech-
nologies away from jurisdictions adopting them, and into opt-out or
"free-for-all" jurisdictions. A substantial percentage of the world's
copyright infringement, including over the Internet, already occurs
outside the United States or the European Union. 354 Companies
developing software and Internet services that implicate copyrights
have sprouted up in various jurisdictions that offer differing levels of
copyright protection, ranging from the quite strict to the nearly non-
existent, from Norway and Russia to South Africa and South Korea. 355
351 SeeJessica E. Vallascero, YouTube Suit Sets Protocol to Shield IDs, WALL ST. J., July
16, 2008, at B6.
352 Associated Press, Internet Privacy Protections Disappear with aJudge's Order, Irrr'L
HERALD TRIB., July 10, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/
15/business/NA-FEA-US-Privacy-Gone.php. Other press coverage of the subpoena
seemed disproportionately restricted to newspapers' blogs, which featured such post-
ings as "One Subpoena Is All It Takes to Reveal Your Online Life," "Court Invites
Viacom to Violate YouTube Viewers' Privacy," and "Want to Clear Your Viewing His-
tory on YouTube? Good Luck." Posting of Saul Hansell to New York Times Bits Blog,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/07/the-privacy-risk-from-the-courts/ (July 7,
2008, 12:02 EST); Faster Forward, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/
2008/07/courtinvitesviacomtoviolat l.html July 7, 2008, 11:00 EST); Web
Scout, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/webscout/2008/07/viacom-youtube.html
(July 16, 2008, 15:15 PT).
353 See Viacom vs You = Boycott, YouTube.com (2008), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GJbCWJNQUYI (last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
354 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Russia, China Once Again Top USTR List of
Piracy Hot Spots (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news-year-fil-
ter=&resultpage=2&id=l 172D7B2-C23D-8C41-DC5D-8370A6F5B86C.
355 Id.; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in InNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT 173, 180-81 (DanielJ. Gervais
ed., 2007); Online Pirates Forced to Walk the Plank, ECONOMIST.COM, June 27, 2005,
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Although courts in the European Union may attempt to exercise juris-
diction over content posted to the Internet in the United States or
elsewhere, 356 their ability to enforce monetary judgments may be
questionable if companies remove their assets from the European
Union in fear of its laws.357 Recognized principles for the enforce-
ments of foreign judgments provide that enforcement will not occur if
it violates the public policy of the state in which enforcement is
sought, for example by contravening the First Amendment or
DMCA.35s
CONCLUSION
We only have one life on Earth. There are billions of books,
links, documents, videos, sounds, and images that might help us maxi-
mize it. People are collaborating socially, politically, professionally,
and culturally on a constant basis using Internet services. The ques-
tion confronting us is, will we support laws and policies that connect
us to a universe of knowledge and communication in more efficient
ways, or will we block search engines and new forms of Internet trans-
mission from achieving their potential? Few of us are likely to make it
into Oxford's Bodleian library or onto the front line on Haifa Street
anytime soon. Those who have made it there, from eyewitnesses and
frustrated professionals with their video and still cameras, to Internet
companies with their scanners and algorithms, want to share what
they've found with us. With unlimited copyright liability, absent a
requirement of knowing infringement of specific items, many or most
of these experiences will be harder to find. Some, like suppressed
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?storyid=E IQTNQSNQ V.
Shannon, P2P Starts to Mature, INT'L HERALD TRB., July 9, 2005, at 16; Jung-a Song,
Korean Court Acquits Music Swap Service, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 2005, at 20;
Candice Jones, SA Embraces Social Networking (June 22, 2007), http://www.mydigi-
tallife.co.za/index.php?option=comcontent&taskview&id=2499&Itemid=2.
356 Yahoo! Inc. v. Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th
Cir. 2006); Landgericht Manheim [LG] [trial court] Dec. 12, 2000, http://www.net
law.de/urteile/lgma_05.htm (F.R.G.) (Gerald Fredrick Toben); David Satola, Legal
Aspects of Internet Governance Reform, 12 INFo. POLITy 49 (2007).
357 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money
Judgments (Mar. 2002), http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/refmj.htm; U.S. Dep't
of State, Judicial Assistance Belgium, http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judi-
cial_666.html.
358 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY- PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 403 (1) (e) (Proposed Final Draft
2007).
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combat footage and out-of-print books, will be totally lost. The intelli-
gent development of copyright safe harbors in the United States and
the European Union can prevent that from happening.
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